Can we compare the stance of Russia and Iran faced with attack from the US?  Some suggest that Iran is acting with more firmness and earning more respect as a result.  Members of the Labour Affairs group discuss the issue:

Eamon

I don’t think you can make this comparison between the Iranian and Russian situations for the following reasons:

Firstly, Iran’s enemy is not on its border. Neither the US nor Israel can easily mount attacks on Iran from their own territories so they rely exclusively on air and sea power. The proxies that US/Israel can muster are not initiated via a land army capable of directly threatening its territory. When it comes to Russia, Europe/NATO has the advantage of its Ukrainian proxy having sufficient forces on its border that can threaten Russian territory.

Secondly, the Iranian economy is nowhere as developed as the Russian economy and therefore the societal impact of an armed attack on it does not carry the same threat to its stability as would a similar attack on the Russian economy – witness the effect of the current Ukrainian attack on its oil refining capacity – an impact that has been somewhat mitigated by the simultaneous closure of the Strait of Hormuz with the resultant hike in the price of oil.

Thirdly, neither the US nor Israel can convincingly argue that Iran is threatening their respective countries in a way that would justify mobilising their ground forces to fight a war of any length. In the case of the EU/NATO the establishment and its media have spent the last twenty years depicting Russia as an existential threat to Europe. That depiction was given added credence as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 – an event that we now see had been choreographed with the assistance of the US since 2008. 

Fourthly, the argument in favour of Russia making a pre-emptive strike on NATO as a means of bringing NATO to its senses precludes the fact that the US has always used Europe as the first line in its nuclear defence wall. Should Europe be hit with tactical nuclear missiles from Russia it would clear the current credibility gap amongst US citizens that continues to restrain the US hawks from directly attacking Russia – something that the decision-makers in Moscow know full well. 

The point is that Moscow never has had the level of freedom of action that would be required if it was to act as the article suggests. That awareness has been central to Moscow’s actions since 2014. Its actions since then have been circumscribed by that awareness. Its incursion into Ukraine in what is commonly but incorrectly described as a “full scale invasion” was the culmination of how far it knew it could go. The power which Moscow invested in placing Russian troop in such numbers on the Ukrainian border in 2021 was in its threat rather than in what it believed it could achieve militarily. Coincidentally with that move was the pressure it believed it could place on the EU and Kiev to reach an agreement on a new security architecture that would remove the threat to its borders. 

When that failed it was compelled to move those troops into Ukraine as a message to convey its seriousness but that fact that it did so without adequate numbers or proper air support gave the lie to the threat. Russian troops then camped on the outskirts of Kiev for a few months in the hope that the government in Kiev would come to an arrangement. 

It almost succeeded in the resultant protocol that was I initialled by Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul in April 2022. However, that agreement was thwarted by Boris Johnson who flew to Kiev to convince Zelensky to tear up the protocol and continue to resist Russia’s demands with the promise of the prospect of Ukrainian NATO membership after it defeated Russia with the covert help of NATO. 

Since then Moscow has been on the back foot when it comes to the idea of it having any alternative to the policy it has been pursuing. It has no alternative to continuing that policy in the hope that eventually Ukrainian civil society will decide it has had enough.

I don’t believe that it’s a coincidence that we are now seeing western media full of stories of Putin losing support at a time when there is growing evidence of a fragmentation of support for Zelensky both inside and outside Ukraine. Nor do I believe it’s a coincidence that Kiev has upped the provocation levels (the attack on the student dormitory) at this time. The only hope for Kiev remains, as it always had, is to create a situation where NATO gets more directly involved. Which is why I remain suspicious of what the author of the article is advocating.

John M.

I think the original article completely misconceives the reasons for Russia´s restraint.

“Russian strategists spent four years believing there was an off-ramp. They believed that their restraint would be recognised. They believed that avoiding escalation would earn them respect in Washington, London and Brussels. They were catastrophically wrong.”

Surely the abiding reason for Russian restraint is that Putin and others regard the Ukranians as a fraternal people? Therefore Ukraine is not to be treated like Chechnya, and no war is to be conducted there, only a Special Military Operation. The capture of the Ukrainian state by Banderist nationalists is considered a perverse aberration. Given time, either the current government will come to their senses, or they will be swept aside and replaced by sensible and constructive people.

Putin has sustained this policy for four years with great nerve and determination. During the last year it has been fraying, with long-range Ukrainian attacks on economic targets needing to be answered in kind. But basically it is still intact. Can it be continued further, with some prospect of eventual political success?

I don’t think that’s an easy question to answer.

Pat W.

I think you are right John. That is how the war was conceived – as a means of bringing the Ukrainians to their senses. But it has had the effect of amplifying Ukrainian nationalism. And I think their being let down by Trump and their having to rely more on their own resources, plus Europe, has solidified their defence. Zaluzhnyi was more NATO/US orientated willing to mount all or nothing counter-offensives but Syrskyi has built a more Ukraine based force with the more limited aim of stopping the Russians fully capturing the 4 oblasts and bleeding them as much as possible, whilst using the drones defensively and long-range to frustrate the Russians. This has proved effective and is giving Putin a problem as he can’t put the war to bed with his current strategy.