David Morrison

Before the US and Israel launched their armed aggression against Iran on 25 February, a report by the US National Intelligence Council (which is part of Tulsi Gabbard’s US Office of National Intelligence) assessed that even a large-scale military assault on the country would be unlikely to overthrow the regime in Tehran, even if the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was assassinated (New York Times, 7 March 2026).

But David Barnea, the head of Israel’s foreign intelligence service Mossad, thought otherwise.  He predicted that within days of the war’s beginning, “if the military goals of the operation were achieved – decapitation of the leadership, as well as serious harm to regime institutions and its capacity to repress its own citizens.”, Mossad and the CIA would likely be able to galvanize the Iranian opposition — igniting riots and other acts of rebellion that could even lead to the collapse of Iran’s government” (Times of Israel, 20 March 2026). 

Netanyahu accepted Barnea’s plan and so did Trump. Despite doubts about its viability among senior American officials and some officials in other Israeli intelligence agencies, both he and President Trump expected a swift regime change and a swift end to the war.  But it hasn’t happened: the Iranian regime has held together so far and lived up to its promise to keep attacking Israel, US bases and other infrastructure in the Gulf States.

Crucially, Iran has taken control of the Strait of Hormuz and is in a position to block one-fifth of the world trade in oil and natural gas from reaching its usual market.  As a result, the global price of oil has risen to over $100 a barrel, which if it persists would have grave consequences for the world economy. 

At the time of writing, there is no sign that the US will be able wrest control of the Strait from Iran – and even if it did, Iran is in position to determine the quantities of oil and liquefied gas that are produced by the Gulf States for export through the Strait.  

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In addition to regime change, Trump’s other war aims include forcing Iran 

(1) to give up uranium enrichment (and prevent it producing nuclear weapons)

(2) to limit the number and range of its missiles, and 

(3) to end its support for regional proxies

However, none of those objectives is achievable without a change of regime to one that is willing to do the bidding of the US and Israel.  But that would require major ground operations involving hundreds of thousands of troops for a prolonged period.  President Trump is not going to do that.

With the price of gasoline in the US rising sharply and 6 out of 10 Americans opposing the war, President Trump is looking for a way out the war that doesn’t look like defeat.  To leave Iran in possession of the 400kg of 60% enriched uranium that could be enriched relatively easily to 90% for nuclear weapons would certainly look like defeat.  But taking the 60% enriched uranium out of Iran would require either US or Israeli ground troops to find it and remove it from Iran.  This may be difficult or even impossible if Iran has hidden it.

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If the 60% enriched uranium is not removed from Iran, then Iran could use it to produce nuclear weapons.  In present circumstances, it would be rational for Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, which are the ultimate weapons of self-defence.  

Iran was one of the original signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the internationally accepted rules-based system governing nuclear activity by states.  It signed the NPT as a ‘non-nuclear-weapon’ state on 1 July 1968 and, by so doing, undertook not to develop nuclear weapons.  It hasn’t developed nuclear weapons.  As required by the NPT, Iran’s nuclear facilities are and always have been under IAEA supervision and the IAEA has never detected any diversion of nuclear material from these nuclear facilities for possible military use.  

Iran’s leaders have repeatedly denied that they have any ambitions to develop nuclear weapons.  What is more, in a speech to nuclear scientists on 22 February 2012, Iran’s Supreme Leader, the late Ayatollah Khamenei, declared the possession of such weapons a “grave sin”.  There was nothing new in this statement: in 2005, he issued a fatwa – a religious edict – saying that “the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons”.

Of course, this is not an absolute constraint on Iran developing nuclear weapons, but it’s unlikely that the religious authorities in Iran would modify this principle unless Iran was perceived to be under an existential threat, most plausibly, after having been attacked by the US and/or Israel.  It has been attacked twice in less than a year.

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Under Article IX of the NPT, Iran would be within its rights to withdraw from the Treaty and remove the constraints upon it due to NPT membership.  Article IX says: 

“Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.”

Over the past 50 years, Israel has built up an arsenal of nuclear weapons, with a triad of delivery options: air, land and sea (the latter from submarines built in Germany and subsidized by the German taxpayer).  By any objective standard, Iran (and other neighbours of Israel) has good grounds for withdrawal from the NPT because of the buildup over the past 40 years of an Israeli nuclear arsenal directed at them.  There could hardly be a better example of “extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty”, which “have jeopardized [their] supreme interests”.

It might not be wise for Iran to withdraw from the NPT at the present time, since it would risk further terrible havoc from the US and/or Israel.  But, there is no doubt that such an action would be within Article IX of the NPT.  

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On 21 March 2026, President Trump threatened Iran with the destruction of its electricity power stations, if the Strait of Hormuz wasn’t open within 48 hours.  Iran responded by threatening to destroy electricity power stations in the Gulf States, at which point the President extended his deadline for 5 days and proposed a 15-point plan as the basis for negotiating an end to US military action against Iran.  

According to Al Jazeera the plan includes:

• A 30-day ceasefire.
• The dismantling of Iran’s nuclear facilities in Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow.
• A permanent commitment from Iran to never develop nuclear weapons.
• The handover of Iran’s stockpile of already enriched uranium to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and a commitment from Iran to allow the IAEA to monitor all elements of the country’s remaining nuclear infrastructure. Iran must also no longer enrich uranium within the country.
• Limits on the range and number of Iran’s missiles.
• Ending Iran’s support for regional proxies.
• Ending Iranian strikes on regional energy facilities.
• Reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
• A removal of all sanctions imposed on Iran, alongside the ending of the UN mechanism that allows sanctions to be reimposed.
• The provision of US support for electricity generation at Iran’s Bushehr civil nuclear plant.

If Iran were to agree to that wish list, it would mean the destruction of its civil nuclear programme and the curtailment of its ability to defend itself against further bouts of armed aggression by the US and Israel.  

It’s inconceivable that Iran will agree to such terms or anything like them.  The Iranian state has survived the present US/Israel attempt to overthrow it, and it is not going to agree to a settlement that undermines its ability to resist the next attempt by the US and/or Israel.

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Iran’s state broadcaster Press TV says, quoting a “senior political-security official”, that Iran has rejected a US proposal aimed at ending the current war.  Press TV didn’t name the official, nor their rank or title, but reports the official saying: “Iran will end the war when it decides to do so and when its own conditions are met”.  

According to Press TV, the official outlined five conditions for the opening of negotiations, including:

• A complete halt to “aggression and assassinations” by the enemy 
• The establishment of concrete mechanisms to ensure that the war is not reimposed on the Islamic Republic
• Guaranteed and clearly defined payment of war damages and reparations 
• The conclusion of the war across all fronts and for all resistance groups involved throughout the region 
• International recognition and guarantees regarding Iran’s sovereign right to exercise authority over the Strait of Hormuz 

David Morrison

27 March 2026