Editorial

Donald Trump has little use for NATO, and even less for Europe’s political leaders. He is openly hostile toward European leaders, many of whom—almost without exception—did what they could to prevent his election as President. During his campaign, Trump made ending the war in Ukraine a central objective. European leaders, in contrast, have elevated the continuation of that war into an article of faith.

This infuriates Trump. It also puzzles him. Why, he asks, do European leaders insist on prolonging a war that no longer serves a clear strategic purpose? And, more importantly, why are they so determined to entangle the United States in this war?

European leaders have long argued that the war must continue because, if Russia wins in Ukraine, it is only a matter of time before it attacks other European countries. Trump regards this as nonsense. He understands the war in Ukraine was caused by NATO’s eastward expansion. He knows that once a new security architecture is put in place that guarantees Russian security on its western border, Russia will have no interest in further expansion. He finds it ridiculous that European leaders suggest otherwise.

As a result, Trump despises European leaders. And precisely because he believes Russia poses no threat to Europe, he sees little point in injecting significant money and energy into NATO. He assumes the United States will, for the most part, act unilaterally, outside NATO. That said, Trump is not the sole force in American politics. The military-industrial complex and the CIA may have different agendas.

Trump frequently argues that had he won the 2020 election, the Ukraine war would never have occurred. That is probably not true. For years, a central objective of US foreign policy in Europe had been to disrupt the increasingly close economic and political relationship between Germany and Russia. That relationship was symbolized by Nord Stream II. Had it continued, Germany—aligned economically with Russia—would have emerged as an extraordinarily powerful political, economic, and potentially military force. The United States was determined to prevent that outcome.

For the past 150 years, British foreign policy has likewise been focused on limiting German power. Britain fought two world wars to achieve this goal, yet Germany has consistently re-emerged as a power in Europe and the world. By the 21st century, it had become the dominant force within the EU, and its growing cooperation with Russia threatened to amplify that dominance even further. Britain was therefore highly motivated to see that relationship ended.

Ukraine became the instrument through which this was achieved. In that sense, the United States and Britain have already “won” the war in Ukraine: the German–Russian relationship has been shattered, perhaps permanently. Trump understands this reality. While he cannot openly explain to Germans that this was the war’s true purpose, he certainly expects British leaders to grasp it—and to recognize that continuing the war makes little sense now that its primary strategic objective has been accomplished. He also expects European leaders to understand that, once Russia’s western border is secured, there is no realistic prospect of further westward expansion.

This context explains the extraordinary contempt evident in Trump’s 90-minute speech at Davos. From his perspective, European leaders are clinging to a pointless war while attempting to drag the United States into a conflict that could escalate into nuclear catastrophe if Russia feels its existence is threatened. His derisive remarks about several leaders—particularly Macron—were without precedent. Starmer’s decision not to attend the conference was likely intended as a calculated insult, one Trump will not forget.

Britain undoubtedly sees an opportunity to become Europe’s leader as the United States withdraws. France may be prepared to accept this, but Germany is unlikely to do so. Furthermore, if it ever becomes widely understood in Germany that the primary purpose of the Ukraine war was yet another Anglo-American attempt to weaken Germany by severing its relationship with Russia, this could seriously jeopardize the entire European project.

If European leaders genuinely want to build a strong and independent Europe, the most direct path would be to repair relations with Russia and resume access to cheap Russian gas. There is, however, a fundamental obstacle to this outcome: Britain does not want a strong Europe—particularly one built on German strength and German–Russian cooperation. There is little reason to believe that Europe’s current leadership class either understands this dynamic or is prepared to confront it.