Will David Lammy have to go “naked into the conference chamber”?

Opposing a resolution in favour of nuclear disarmament at the Labour Party conference in 1957, Aneurin Bevan declared 

“if you carry this resolution and follow out all its implications … you will send a British Foreign Secretary, whoever he may be, naked into the conference chamber”.

Since then, the UK has retained a nuclear deterrent and no British Foreign Secretary has suffered the indignity of being sent naked into the conference chamber.  But could David Lammy be the first?

(*)

Accompanied by the Minister of Defence, John Healey, Sir Keir Starmer recently visited HMS Vanguard, one of the UK’s nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines, which had just returned to base in Scotland after more than 200 days at sea.  Vanguard is one of four nuclear powered submarines, one of which is supposed to be at sea continuously so that Sir Keir can launch nuclear weapons at any time.  

A Sky News article on the occasion of the visit by their Security & Defence Editor, Deborah Haynes, was entitled “PM makes rare visit to nuclear-armed submarine to show UK’s strength – but Putin will notice a potential weakness”

The “potential weakness” which she says “Putin will notice” is the fact that “the fleet is operating well beyond its original in-service life of 25 years because of delays in the building of four replacement boats”.  As a result “patrols by one of the UK’s nuclear-armed submarines – which used to last three months – have had to be extended in recent years because of prolonged periods of maintenance and repair work on the other boats”.  

More fundamental weakness

Deborah Haynes didn’t mention the more fundamental weakness of the UK system, namely, that it’s not fully under UK control.  At least nine states ­in the world now possess nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them.  All of them, bar one, manufacture and maintain their own nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them.  All of them, bar one, have complete control over the use of their systems.  In other words, all of them, bar one, possess what can reasonably be described as an “independent” nuclear deterrent that doesn’t rely on another state to provide vital parts of it.

The exception is Britain.  China has an “independent” nuclear deterrent.  So has France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia and the US.  Britain hasn’t.  

Unlike other states that have nuclear weapons systems, Britain is dependent on another state to manufacture an essential element of its only nuclear weapons system – the Trident missiles that are supposed to carry Britain’s weapons to target.  These are manufactured by Lockheed Martin in the US.

Fraudulent

Britain’s dependence on the US doesn’t end with the purchase of these missiles – Britain depends on the US Navy to service the missiles as well.  A common pool of missiles is maintained at the US Strategic Weapons facility at Kings Bay, Georgia, USA, from which the US itself and Britain draw serviced missiles as required.  

There is some doubt about the degree of “operational” independence that Britain enjoys in respect of its nuclear weapons system (of which more later).  But there is no doubt that Britain is dependent on the US for the manufacture and maintenance of a key element of the system. So, to call it an “independent” nuclear deterrent is fraudulent.

(The UK used to operate another nuclear weapons system, which used WE-177 free-fall bombs, but this system was decommissioned in 1998).

Dependence on US to continue indefinitely

This dependence on the US for missiles for the UK nuclear deterrent is scheduled to continue indefinitely.  In December 2006, the Blair government published a White Paper that proposed that the UK should continue to have a nuclear deterrent.  To that end, (a) a second generation of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines was to be built to replace the Vanguard class and come into service from 2024 onwards, and (b) the UK was to participate in the US Navy’s programme to extend the life of the Trident missiles into the 2040s. In other words, it was planned that US-supplied Trident missiles will be essential to the UK’s nuclear deterrent for many years to come.

(In March 2007, these White Paper proposals were endorsed by the House of Commons by 409 votes to 161, 87 Labour backbenchers joining the LibDems and the Scottish and Welsh nationalists in voting against.)

Non-functional if US/UK relations sour

Surprisingly, in the 2006 White Paper the Blair government conceded that our US-dependent nuclear deterrent will become non-functional if relations sour with the US and it refuses to supply the UK with Trident missiles.  Paragraph 4-7 of the White Paper said:

“We continue to believe that the costs of developing a nuclear deterrent relying solely on UK sources outweigh the benefits. We do not see a good case for making what would be a substantial additional investment in our nuclear deterrent purely to insure against a, highly unlikely, deep and enduring breakdown in relations with the US. We therefore believe that it makes sense to continue to procure elements of the system from the US.”

Today, the Labour Government would probably not assert that a “deep and enduring breakdown in relations with the US” is “highly unlikely”.  But that possibility now exists and, as a result, so does the possibility that the UK will cease to have a nuclear deterrent.  And it’s too late to take out an insurance policy against it, because the process of building the replacement submarines is underway, at a cost of £31 billion, with an additional £10 billion contingency, which is sure to be used.  Operating costs are expected to be around £3 billion a year.  The submarines were originally to be in service by 2025, but now it is likely to be well into the 2030s, over 25 years after the plan to build them was first approved by parliament.

Operationally independent?

On another point, British Governments have always insisted that Britain’s nuclear weapons system is “operationally” independent of the US.  The December 2006 White Paper (4-6) states that “the UK’s current nuclear deterrent is fully operationally independent of the US”.  Apparently, if Sir Keir decides to press the nuclear button, it is impossible for the US to stop the launch of missiles or prevent them from delivering British nuclear warheads to the selected target.  Maybe so.

Is Sir Keir really free to strike any target he chooses in this world with nuclear weapons, at a time of his choosing, using US-supplied missiles?  I doubt that the US would sell any foreign power – even a close ally – a weapons system with which the foreign power is free to do catastrophic damage to US allies, not to mention the US itself.  Surely, the US must have a mechanism, under its explicit control, to prevent the targeting of states that it doesn’t want targeted?  

David Morrison

2 May 2025