Israel’s Iranian Dilemma­—Editorial

On 1st April Israel attacked an Iranian consulate in Damascus. 16 people were killed including two senior Iranian generals.  This attack was against international law and gave Iran the right to make a retaliatory strike against Israel.  But Israel has always made it clear that any attack on Israel would be responded to with even greater force by Israel.  This policy of ‘deterrence supremacy’ meant that states would often tolerate attacks made on them by Israel.  For many years Iran has absorbed the killing of its scientists and military personnel by Israel, because of the latter’s policy of ‘deterrence supremacy’.  However, after the attack on 1st April, Iran decided to formally deal with Israel’s illegal attack.

Iran proceeded carefully.  It attempted to have the Israeli attack condemned in the UN. The US, UK and France blocked the motion, pretending that it was not clear that Israel had made the attack.  We understand that Iran offered not making a retaliatory strike against Israel if Israel ended its genocide in Gaza but that Israel rejected this offer.  Iran therefore announced that it would make a retaliatory strike.

The nature of the retaliatory strike on 13th April was clearly stated by Iran.  It would be proportionate and would target only military assets.  Indeed, Israel was given some five hours warning of the attack since five hours was the time it would take Iran’s slow moving drones to reach Israel.  The Iranians even showed the launching of the drones on television.  

The attack by Iran on Israel was successful in two main ways.  Firstly, Iran’s missiles hit the targets that they were supposed to hit, secondly, many of the features of Israel’s air defence system were revealed to Iran.  No civilians were killed in the attack.  A 7-year old Bedouin girl was seriously injured by shrapnel resulting from Israeli air-defence missiles.

Iran made clear to the world that the attack was a legitimate and proportionate retaliatory response to the Israeli destruction of its consulate in Damascus.  But Iran went further than that.  They said that they would draw a line under the incident after their retaliatory attack.  But, if Israel attempted to use its standard policy of ‘deterrence supremacy’ by launching a massive attack on Iran, then Iran would launch an even greater attack on Israel.  This position, taken by Iran, is even more important than the retaliatory attack.  It was the first time that a state in the region had rejected Israel’s demand for ‘deterrence supremacy’.  Iran did not stop there.  They said that if Israel launched a massive attack on Iran then Iran would reserve the right to reconsider whether they should develop nuclear weapons.  

Netanyahu and the Israeli government were faced with a major dilemma.  Could they risk responding to Iran’s retaliatory attack in the way that they would previously have done, i.e. with an even stronger attack on Iran. The success of Iran’s attack on 13th April had revealed to both Israel and Iran that Iran could inflict significant damage on Israel in a war based on conventional weapons.  Perhaps, with American help, much damage could have been done to Iran.  But the US did not want a war with Iran, refused to support Israel in a further attack on Iran and advised Israel to paint the Iranian attack on Israel as a failure, claim that Israel had won because it had destroyed all Iran’s drones and missiles and draw a line under the matter.  The US had probably also concluded that its own bases and military hardware in the region would suffer considerable damage in a conventional war.

Israel and Netanyahu struggled immensely with the idea that Israel must yield ‘deterrence supremacy’ to Iran. But the moment of truth had arrived and Israel blinked.  Israel made a gesture at responding to the Iranian attack but did not attempt to re-establish ‘deterrence supremacy’.  The matter appears to be ended for now.   All the Arab states in the region will have taken note.

But can Israel exist in a Middle East in which it does not have ‘deterrence supremacy’ over Iran?  If not, how will they re-establish that ‘deterrence supremacy’?  They will surely attempt to do so.  If nuclear weapons are the only way they can do so, will Israel take that step?  Would the US tolerate such a move?  The answers to these questions will emerge in the coming weeks and months.  But, it should be noted that nothing in Israel’s history over the past 75 years suggests it will be prepared to live in a world in which it does not have ‘deterrence supremacy’.

In the interim, Netanyahu can revert to waging his genocide against the Palestinians of Gaza who have few weapons.  The slaughter that has taken place so far has reduced Israel’s credibility in the world to zero.  It is seen for what it is – a conquering and colonizing state with a callous disregard for the lives of the people in the lands that it has occupied.  

Israel under Netanyahu has become a liability for the US rather than an asset.  The confrontation with Iran will have further emphasised that fact.  

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