

# Irish Foreign Affairs

Volume 15, Number 2

June 2022

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“Every nation, if it is to survive as a nation, must study its own history and have a foreign policy”  
—C.J. O’Donnell, *The Lordship of the World*, 1924, p.145

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## CONTENTS

The Tyrant Question *Brendan Clifford* p. 2

Global Britain and Ukraine *Pat Walsh* p. 7

Clash of Civilisations in Ukraine *Pat Walsh* p. 10

Ukraine and the Russian Orthodox Church *Peter Brooke* p. 15

Economics and the European Union — Part 6 *Peter Brooke* p. 25

On Paul Rohrbach and the Origin of the Ottoman Armenian Relocations of 1915  
*Pat Walsh* p. 30

Kissinger at Davos 2022 p. 36

## The Tyrant Question

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The English state was of no particular consequence to the world until King Henry the Eighth took it out of the European consensus and made it a rogue Empire with the seeds of anti-European culture planted in it.

It might be that he did this only because the recently established Tudor dynasty—the State—needed a male heir to stabilise it; and his European wife failed to produce one that lived more than a few weeks; and the Pope, who might have dissolved the marriage under the emergency provisions available to the Papacy for dealing with such things, had not just then been captive to his wife's family, and under orders not to humiliate it by enabling Henry to set her aside so that he could try to breed an heir with a replacement Queen.

But these were the facts. Henry needed a new Queen. The present one was unable to fulfil the primary function of a Queen, which was to produce the next King. She had to be replaced for reasons of State. The Papacy was unable to authorise the replacement at the actual moment. So Henry gave himself the authority to dissolve his marriage by declaring himself head of the Catholic Church in England. And then one thing led to another.

There is a heartfelt novel by Phillipa Gregory in which Henry is presented as a disgusting heap of rotting flesh with which a succession of young Queens had to find ways of copulating, while he made spur of the moment decisions about the doctrines which the people of England were to believe in future. And, as he changed his mind, so they were obliged to change their beliefs.

The Pope in Rome issued Articles of Faith which must be believed. But he was surrounded by a College of Cardinals. The Cardinals were the Pope-makers. They elected him to be their leader, and therefore they were not his subjects. He was the first among equals, and he was restrained from capricious action by them. The Church was infallible but the meaning of infallibility was a disputed matter. It was not until the mid-19th century that the function of infallibility was assigned to the Pope.

But, in England, in the 1530s and 1540s everything was decided by Henry on the spur of the moment, as the inspiration struck him. And his subjects were credulous of the incredible.

Rome maintained a smooth flow of doctrine over the centuries but changed it gradually to cope with circumstances. And believing today what you were required not to believe yesterday has a different quality to it than believing what your remote ancestors did not believe. The over-ruling of reason is more apparent, and instability of the believing individual is more gross.

Henry was a tyrant. He was a king who asserted the unconditional sovereignty of his kingdom, gave it centralised government, and gave it a State. By doing this he overcame the inheritance of Magna Charta, which was a concession made by a weak king to the nobles.

Rule by nobles was disorderly by nature. The Magna Charta was condemned by the Pope for that reason. One of the jobs of the Papacy was to tend to the establishment of orderly and effective government in the countries of Western Christendom. Due to the circumstances in Europe around 1530, this was done

in England through a breach with the Papacy and a withdrawal from the European consensus. That was the English *Sonderweg* [special way].

Henry was a tyrant both in the politically meaningful historical sense of the term and in the meaningless rhetorical sense in which the term has been used in recent times.

When the British Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was deciding whether to make war on Iraq and destroy it as a State, he consulted some fashionable academics about the project. His essential question to them was: Is Saddam Hussein an evil tyrant? He was given some complicated explanation of what Saddam had been doing, but that was not what he wanted. He wanted reassurance: He is an evil tyrant, isn't he? And what public employee would have had it in him to answer, No, he isn't?

But the term "*evil tyrant*" had become a redundancy. If he was a tyrant, he was Evil. The very idea of a good tyrant—a necessary and effective tyrant—had become unthinkable in England.

The only note of dissent heard in the English Establishment was that of the Archbishop of Canterbury. He voiced some doubt about the advisability of what the Prime Minister intended doing to Iraq. He was brought on BBC's *Newsnight* and questioned by the Sophist of the moment, Jeremy Paxman:

Saddam was evil, wasn't he?

Well, the Archbishop replied, all states are a mixture of good and evil.

Was he suggesting that there was evil in the British state!!

The Archbishop went back into his box.

Saddam Hussein was certainly a tyrant in the constructive sense of the term. Whether he was also a tyrant in the petty secondary sense (which has become the exclusive sense), I don't know. He was destroyed by foreign invasion while engaged in the constructive work of State-building, whereas the invasion force to prevent Henry from constructing England into an anti-Europe Empire never got going during his life-time.

A book about Good and Evil in public affairs has recently been published by a Professor of Psychology, *A History Of Love And Hate in 21 Statues* by Peter Hughes. The chapter on Henry is entitled *Our Lady Of Caversham*. There was a shrine to Our Lady in Caversham which was a place of pilgrimage in the old order and was incompatible with Henry's new order, which he was establishing piecemeal as the requirements of the moment inspired him. Henry, the capricious destroyer in order to create, is described thus:

"Henry's fate, as the fate of all tyrants, was a toxic brew of narcissism, fantasy, paranoia and isolation. The more power Henry took for himself, the more he saw dissent in every shadow, which compelled a physical and emotional retreat into himself. Trusting no one, he deceived himself and allowed himself to be deceived by flatterers and sycophants, the enablers of tyrants. The depth of his paranoia was such that "if I thought my cap knew my counsel, I would cast it into the fire and burn it"..." (p33).

“Corruption of this magnitude is viral... When Henry tired of Anne Boleyn and sought evidence of her infidelity, Lady Jane Parker, wife of Anne Boleyn’s brother, obliged him. She accused her husband, George Boleyn, who was Anne’s brother, of having sexual relations with his sister. If she expected Henry to remember her loyalty to him, he didn’t. When in 1542 she herself was accused of enabling an affair between Catherine Howard, Henry’s fifth wife, and Thomas Culpepper, a friend of the king, she was arrested and put in the Tower of London, where she underwent a psychological collapse and was pronounced insane. Despite her condition she was found guilty of high treason and executed on the same day as the queen.

“Henry, in a typical expression of the tyrant’s belief in his own victimhood, regretted his ill-luck in meeting such ill-conditioned wives, and blaming the Council for the last mischief. As for Thomas Culpepper, he was sentenced to be hanged, disembowelled while still alive, and then quartered for his betrayal of the king. After pleas from his family, Henry granted Culpepper a gentleman’s death by decapitation.”

None of these people were ordinary decent citizens—assuming ordinary decent citizens existed then. They were all involved in one way or another in an unstable power structure which was in the process of being sorted into a functional system of State. And many more substantial people than these nobles were drawn into that effort of State-construction, contributed to it, were victims of it, and died at the will of the tyrant without cursing him, or even disowning him. It was their privilege to have been of use to him.

The psyches of individuals immersed in a great enterprise like that—which was remaking the conditions of human existence—have not got much in common with the psyches evolved in comprehensively secured capitalist democracies in which the middle classes serve out their lives with the regularity of clockwork. There is no general psychology which is a norm from which everything different is a deviation requiring a remedy.

The eleventh edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* was published a couple of years before the First World War. It was the work of the middle class, re-admitted to the Corridors of

Political Power after their long exclusion because of the mess they made of their seizure of power in the 1640s. They had worked diligently for seventy years at bourgeoisifying the aristocratic State system. They had, by their own reckoning, completed and perfected the construction of the State. They too were State-makers. They looked back to Henry’s time, in which the seeds of themselves were planted, with a degree of sympathy and understanding. And their master-works of scholarship were that edition of the *Encyclopaedia*, The Dictionary Of National Biography, Pollock & Maitland on Law, and Dicey on the Constitution.

Here is how the *Encyclopaedia* saw Henry:

“...He has been described as a “*despot under the forms of law*”; and it is apparently true that he committed no illegal act. His despotism consists not in any attempt to rule unconstitutionally, but in the extraordinary degree to which he was able to use constitutional means in the furtherance of his own personal ends. His industry, his remarkable insight, his lack of scruple, and his combined strength of will and subtlety of intellect enabled him to utilise all the forces which tended at the time towards strong government throughout western Europe. In Michelet’s words, “*le nouveau Messie est le roi*”; and monarchy alone seemed to be capable of guiding the state through the social and political anarchy which threatened all nations in their transition from mediaeval to modern organisation. The king was the emblem, the focus and the bond of national unity; and to preserve it men were ready to put up with vagaries which to other ages seem intolerable. Henry could thus behead ministers and divorce wives with comparative impunity, because the individual appeared to be of little importance compared with the state. This impunity provoked a licence which is responsible for the unlovely features of Henry’s reign and character. The elevation and isolation of his position fostered a detachment from ordinary virtues and compassion, and he was a remorseless incarnation of Machiavelli’s Prince. He had an elastic conscience which was always at the beck and call of his desire, and he cared little for principle. But he had a passion for efficiency, and for the greatness of England and himself. His mind in spite of its clinging to the outward forms of the old faith, was intensely secular; and he was as devoid of moral sense as he was of a genuine religious temperament. His greatness consists in his practical aptitude, in his political perception, and in the self-restraint which enabled him to continue within limits tolerable to his people an insatiable appetite for power.”

Henry was devoid of moral sense. Moral is Latin for customary, and ethical is Greek for it. The use of foreign words suggests a more elevated meaning. This suggestion may facilitate a charge that is going on in what is customary. A new custom may be more easily established by use of the mystique surrounding the foreign word, but in the long run what prevails as moral is customary.

The customs of feudal life were not the customs of capitalist life, and so the organiser of the transition from feudal ways to capitalist ways could not be enacted within the morality of feudalism.

In feudal times the King was the first of the nobles, and was often hard put to maintain his primacy. Henry inherited a feudal kingdom, given momentary stability by his father, and remade the monarchy into a State power beyond the power of the nobility to challenge. In the doing of this, he made use of any accidents that came along, and there were always able individuals produced by social developments who were willing to do jobs for him.

*Irish Foreign Affairs* is a publication of  
the *Irish Political Review* Group.  
55 St Peter’s Tce., Howth, Dublin 13

Editor: Philip O’Connor  
ISSN 2009-132X

Printers: Athol Books, Belfast  
[www.atholbooks.org](http://www.atholbooks.org)  
Price per issue: €4 (Sterling £3)  
Annual postal subscription €16 (£14)  
Annual electronic subscription €4 (£3)

All correspondence:  
[Philip@atholbooks.org](mailto:Philip@atholbooks.org)  
Orders to:  
[atholbooks-sales.org](http://atholbooks-sales.org)

And the glorification of himself as King was a requirement of the process as well as being to his personal taste. A self-effacing suburban King would not have done at all, nor would a grandiose poseur.

Henry established a new order of things by apparently generating mayhem all around himself and shaping it purposefully as he went along. He chastened the old nobility, produced a new, upstart nobility and, even if his conscious purpose was only to establish his own will as absolutely dominant, the outcome was an absolute State.

Professor Hughes has a chapter entitled, Joseph Stalin. It is not about Stalin at all, apart from the mention that there was a statue of him in Buda Pest. It is about post-War Hungary:

“Statues bear witness to truth. Before they can stand, two spaces must be cleared: a space in a park... and a space in the minds of the people. The first is easy. The second is hard to sustain.

“Preparing the ground for truth is a brutal affair. In Hungary, it began with the occupation of the country by the Soviet Union after the defeat of Germany in the Second World War. Despite getting a fifth of the vote in Hungary’s first free elections on 4 November 1945, the communists, led by the Stalinist Matyas Rakosi, sought to take control of the country. To this end, they adopted what Rakosi called ‘salami tactics’. He explained that their ‘demands were always modest at first—and were then increased’, stealth paving the way to terror...” (p200).

(Salami tactics are standard practice in political negotiation and manipulation. Former Taoiseach John Bruton was shocked when, as EU Commissioner, he saw Britain implementing such tactics in negotiations with the EU. The British would achieve a degree of concession on a marginal demand, pocket it, expand it into an accomplished fact, and use it as take-off point for the next demand.)

What was the position of Hungary in 1945? Was it a country occupied by the Soviet Union after the defeat of Germany? Did Russia make war on Hungary, defeat it, and try to impose a system on it which it did not want? Is there to be found in any library a book on the Russian war on Hungary in the mid-20th century?

Hungary came to be occupied by Russia through having made War on Russia as part of the European Fascist alliance that made war on Russia with the object of destroying it. This was the greatest war of destruction ever fought. It has been described ever since—or until the Spring of this year—as an attempt by Germany and its allies to destroy civilisation.

The attempt failed because Russia defended itself. In order to defend itself it had to fight the invading armies back into their homelands.

It did not vacate the lands of the invading countries immediately after defeating their armies. It secured itself against them by occupying them for a while, and superintending the formation of Governments in them which were not hostile to it.

The European invasion of Russia was launched in June 1941. For practical purposes Russia fought against Europe alone for three years. Britain had declared war on Germany in 1939 over the obscure issue of Danzig, but had withdrawn its small army from France after suffering its first reverse in June 1940. It sent an Army back to France four years later. It did this at the insistence of the United States which was eager to engage in battle with Germany. That was in May 1944, when it had

become a virtual certainty that Germany and its allies would be defeated by Russia.

If Germany was not been attacked from the West by the United States and Britain in 1944, the probability was that Russia—by defending itself alone from the European attack on it—would become the dominant Power in Europe.

D Day is best understood, geo-politically, as a pre-emptive move against Russia, even though the ideological rhetoric of the moment was anti-German, and it was a detachment of the German Army that opposed the Channel crossing.

Though Britain declared war on Germany in 1939, it tried to engage in war against Finland early in 1940. Britain was defeated in battle by Germany in June 1940 but it refused to negotiate an end to the war, and made war on its ally, France, because it accepted the fact of military defeat and made terms with Germany. Britain then stood, rather than fought, alone for a year. Then, in 1941, it became an ally of Russia because Germany invaded Russia. It was a purely objective alliance: an alliance of mere military fact involving no degree of sentimental affinity. In every other sense than the strictly military, the British Empire was the enemy of Russia.

It is a maxim of British foreign affairs that it has no friends, only interests. What British interest required was that the Russian defence should hold against the German attack, not that Russia should be victorious over Germany.

The United States entered the War at the end of 1941. It was eager to get on with the fighting by landing an Army in France in 1942, but Britain vetoed this. The German and Russian Armies were inflicting enormous casualties on each other. The Russian defence was holding but a Russian defeat of Germany was not in the offing. It suited the British interest that this condition of things should be allowed to continue.

Britain again resisted American pressure for a Channel crossing in 1943. Russia was pushing the German forces back, but the fighting was still within the borders of Russia, and a Russian conquest of the European countries that had attacked it still did not seem likely.

In 1944 the Americans were more insistent, and a Russian defensive advance into central Europe was a distinct possibility. A Channel crossing could not be delayed any longer, if Britain was to have a substantial presence in Europe when the War it had launched against Germany, having become a German/Russian War, was won by Russia.

The British, in tow to the Americans, managed to get an army into Germany to meet the Russians.

What were the Ameranglian and Russian Armies to do when they met? Washington and London were more profoundly in disagreement with Moscow than they had ever been with Berlin in matters relating to civilisation. Churchill was an open admirer of Fascism up to the point where Foreign Office mishandling of affairs led to Britain declaring war on Germany. In his history of the War, written soon after the event, when he was the hero of “*the Anti-Fascist War*”, Churchill said the war on Germany was an Unnecessary War. The necessary war was the war with Russia, which had established a social system that Western civilisation could not live with.

Nazism was popular in England until War was declared by Chamberlain. *Mein Kampf*, which was subsequently depicted as the vilest book ever written, a self-evidently evil book, was translated into English in the early thirties and issued in a standard edition. Then it was re-issued in an Illustrated edition. And, finally, it was published in serialised form in a magazine



format. And a translation of Hitler's *Addresses to Businessmen* was published by the Oxford University Press just as the War was about to begin.

Fascism was a means by which Capitalism in crisis had been saved from Communism, by curbing the system of party-politics which drove antagonisms to extremes, by curbing Finance Capitalism, by establishing Corporate structures in industry, and by Social Welfare reform—while retaining the market system. In Britain party-politics was restrained by the voluntary coalition of the Labour and Tory Parties in National Governments from 1931 to 1945, and effective Trade Union activity took the form of deals between capitalists and Trade Union leaders who familiarised themselves with the detail of business enterprises in a practice that was not corporatist in form but resembled it in practice.

If the Franco-British War on Germany is taken to have been a war between Democracy and Fascist forms of capitalism, then the fascist form was the more effective. The German/Russian War was a war between Fascist Capitalism and Communism in which Communism proved the more effective.

The Communist State, having defeated the European Fascist attempt to destroy it, found itself in occupation of a line of Fascist countries. It arranged for those countries to be governed in a way that disabled their anti-Communist/anti-Russian proclivities. If it had withdrawn from them after defeating them militarily, they would immediately have become the front-line of the Anglo-American—or Ameranglian—assault on Russia.

Churchill was entirely right when he wrote that Russia had always been the fundamental enemy, even when it had been the major force in the Alliance which destroyed Fascist military power. The antagonism within that Alliance therefore asserted itself as the dominant thing in world affairs as soon as the German distraction was got out of the way. And it divided the world in way that it had never been divided before. It made the world a unity and split it in two.

The Soviet Union decided the affairs of one half and the USA decided the affairs of the other half. And, when a State with one half began to veer towards the ways of the other half, it was stamped on.

There was, however, a difference in the way hegemony was exercised. When a Government in the Western half strayed towards what the USA saw as Communism, the country was invaded and a new Government installed. Guatemala was the first of these. It nationalised the property of an American multi-national and was dealt with. Many other interventions followed, with the most bloody being the overthrow of the Government of Indonesia, which involved the slaughter of an entire Communist party.

Soviet hegemony was exercised in a different way. The Kremlin had a substantial political force within each of the Fascist countries in Eastern Europe which it had defeated and occupied in 1944-5: the Communist Party. Fascism was raised as an ideology and a political practice against Communism, and Communism maintained an organised presence within all the states that became Fascist. And Communism was in principle an international form of working class organisation.

Professor Hughes writes that:

“Despite getting a fifth of the vote in Hungary’s first free elections on 4 November 1945, the communists, led by the Stalinist Malyas Rakosi, sought to take control...”

The elections were free, subject to the well-understood condition that the Government must be friendly to Russia, which had liberated the country from its freely-chosen anti-Communist regime which had made war on Russia.

Hungary had taken part in the war to destroy Communist Russia—a war which at the time was presented by Britain, which was dependent on Russia to carry through the war on Germany which Britain had declared, as a war by Germany to destroy civilisation. It was therefore not free, after losing that war, to have any Government it pleased. Nor was Germany. And neither was Guatemala free to have any Government it pleased—even though it had never made war on the United States.

With elements which had participated in the Fascist regime outlawed from constructive politics, an organised body of 20% of the electorate was a solid foundation for Communist Party dominance of political affairs after 1945. Support for the Party increased as it asserted its authority in government. And Communist Party government also averted public disputes over conduct during the Fascist era.

Trouble for the Party did not come from the outer society, but from within the Party.

Lazlo Rajk, a prominent member of the Party leadership, was accused of treasonable activity by Rakosi. He was put to trial, confessed, and was executed. A purge of the Party followed.

Rajk’s confession was found by many to be unbelievable. Dissenting groups were formed, such as the Petofe Circle and the Kossuth Club. In October 1956 Khrushchev launched his famous attack on Stalinism in the Russian Communist Party. This had a disturbing effect on Hungary. It disoriented Rakosi. There were some demonstrations. Moscow decided on military intervention. Imre Nagy, Communist Prime Minister in 1953-55, appealed for Western intervention. The insurrection was suppressed. Nagy was executed. Janos Kadar took over as Communist Party leader and thirty-five years of stable Communist Government followed.

Professor Hughes writes, about Hungary in 1956:

“It was, according to the political theorist Hannah Arendt, a battle fought for ‘Freedom and Truth’. She quoted a young Hungarian girl describing how she was ‘brought up amidst lies... We could not have a healthy idea because everything was choked in us’. This was the essence of Stalinism: the subordination of truth to ideology and the preservation of the lie through terror... The Party determined the truth and enforced it on the people” (p204).

“*This was Stalinism*”—which means that it was through fakery that the Nazi threat to civilisation was defeated.

Fascism arose out of liberal democracy. It dominated Europe. It was defeated by Stalinism, which destroys truth, with liberal democracy being an onlooker for most of the War. Stalinism was a system of belief which subordinated fact to fantasy—and yet it came to control half of the world!

Hannah Arendt is best known for the phrase, “*the banality of evil*” (meaning that evil is something that normal and ordinary people can do), and a book on Totalitarianism. I first came across the word “*totalitarian*” in a piece of writing during the World War by a Nationalist in Northern Ireland, who wanted to describe the Northern Ireland pseudo-state as fascist. Totalitarian is a word which dissolved the difference between Nazi Germany and Communist Russia and was therefore acceptable to nationalist Ireland which kept out of the War, but was not acceptable to Britain at the time, as it depended

on Communist success against Nazism—though it gained currency afterwards.

Professor Hughes also has a chapter on Saddam Hussein. But it is really about George Bush and his “*misperception*” of Saddam Hussein:

“Saddam proved, on multiple occasions, that he wasn’t difficult to deter: he dismantled his nuclear weapons programme, he suspended his chemical and biological weapons programme. He allowed intensive inspection. He showed himself to be cautious in his relationship with the US and concerned above all to preserve and protect his regime against the threat posed by Iran. Yet Bush’s default position was to assume the intentions of Saddam Hussein were always malign, that he was supportive of Bin Laden and sought to kill Americans in vast numbers at any cost to himself”.

And Colin Powell told all of this to the United Nations in February 2003.

This was the second American “*misunderstanding*” of Iraq. In the first April Glaspie, Ambassador to Kuwait, told Saddam that the US had “*no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait*”. Yet, when asked why her attempts at deterring Saddam failed, Glaspie replied that—

“We foolishly did not realise that he was stupid, that he did not believe our clear and repeated warnings that we would support our vital interests”.

Bush was equally perplexed by Saddam’s behaviour: “*How much clearer could I have been?*”

Rakosi accused Rajk of being a secret agent of the USA, put him on trial, and executed him on the strength of a confession. The assumption is that Rajk, by confessing, told a lie against himself.

Professor Hughes says that up to a million were investigated as Rajk’s possible colleagues, and 2,500 were executed.

Washington gave Saddam to understand that he was free to act against Kuwait, which he accused of stealing Iraqi oil while Iraq was holding the ring against the spread of the Iranian revolution. When Saddam acted, Washington made war on him for breaching international law. The memorable event of that war was the great “*Turkey shoot*” by the US Air Force of the Iraqi Army which was trying to get back home when the “*misunderstanding*” was cleared up.

Iraq was then subjected to close supervision by the American Air Force for a decade, meaning that its infrastructure was bombed to bits. As it tried to repair the destroyed basics of urban life, the Air Force destroyed it again.

Washington knew everything that was happening in Iraq—or, at least, had the means of knowing. But, after the Twin Towers episode, it accused Saddam of being in league with Bin Laden, demanded that he surrender the nuclear weapons which he did not have, and made war on him again when he refused.

This was the “*Shock and Awe*” war, which destroyed the Iraqi apparatus of State, and brought to the fore the Islamic Fundamentalism which Saddam’s regime had been holding in check.

And then Washington made war on the Fundamentalism which it had itself deliberately initiated and liberated.

I forget how many millions of casualties of that “*misunderstanding*” there are reckoned to be.

Professor Hughes writes as if Truth and Lies in matters of State were clearly and easily distinguishable from each other. But at this point the matter becomes confused.

If a liberal does not assume the United States to be a system based on Truth—in contrast to Stalinism based on lies—then where in the world is Truth to be found?

And, if what Washington had done with Iraq is compatible with truthfulness, what is the use of truth?

He suggests that, in Intelligence-gathering, “*They saw patterns where they did not exist*”, and were misled—though it is hard to see how that could apply to April Glaspie!

Another psychologist is referred to as claiming that:

“Our perceptions about reality are dependent upon the beliefs we hold about it. Reality exists independent of human minds, but our understanding of it depends upon the beliefs we hold at any given time... Once we classify the world in line with our beliefs, we have a strong compulsion to fit new information into familiar categories” (p228: But surely, in human affairs, reality is not entirely objective, independent of belief, but beliefs constitute a significant part of it).

If Bush “*saw patterns where they did not exist*” in the vast quantities of Intelligence which he received, why could not Rakosi have done likewise? And it seems to me that Rakosi had much better reason to suppose that there was probably a Western agent in the hierarchy of the Communist Party than President Bush had for thinking that Saddam Hussein was in league with Bin Laden or had nuclear weapons.

And as to “*Stalinism*”, it is something that existed only with Stalin. He took in hand a very unusual framework of State, conceived by Lenin but left behind by Lenin as a work in progress. It was entirely out of keeping with the practice of European civilisation—which took itself to be just “*civilisation*”—though conceived within it. European civilisation tried to crush it at the outset but failed, having many other things in mind at the time.

It was widely assumed that the force of World Capitalism would crush it before very long. But, within a generation, the Stalinist structure in Russia ended up saving a remnant of European civilisation from the Fascist means by which it had sought to destroy Communism. Paradox! And that is the best reason there could be for hating Stalinism!

If it is said that Lazlo Rajk went to the gallows shouting “*Long live the party!*”, and that is what really disturbs Professor Hughes.

In 1936, when senior figures in the Russian Communist Party were confessing treason, and there was much bewilderment in the West, the London *Times* commented that it was very similar to what happened in London when the State was being constructed by Henry VIII.

It is obvious that when a body of people is engaged in great collective enterprise the psychology of Suburbia does not apply.

Brendan Clifford

# Global Britain and Ukraine

By Pat Walsh

A noticeable feature of the conflict in Ukraine is the leading role of the UK government in encouraging the government in Kiev to wage war against Russia, facilitating the escalation of the fighting and the obstructing of its resolution.

Aside from the substantial military supplies Kiev has received from the UK, it is from London that the Zelensky government has received the strongest and most unrelenting moral support. Prime Minister Boris Johnson was the first Western leader to pledge lethal aid to the Ukrainians, the first Western leader to address the Ukrainian parliament and one of the few to visit Kiev (once it was known that the Russians had no intention of capturing it).

It is from the British government that there has been the greatest encouragement to Kiev to fight on until the end, regardless of cost. Johnson is also said to have been involved in dissuading Zelensky from continuing to negotiate with Russia at Istanbul to find a solution to the war. The British Foreign Secretary made it clear early in the war that she supported British volunteers going to Ukraine to fight the Russians and has recently said that Russia should be pushed out of Crimea, defining Ukrainian war aims in the most grandiose and unrealistic terms which Moscow would never accept short of complete defeat.

In Kiev the Ukrainians have reciprocated the British embrace developing a cult of Johnson and his Churchill rhetoric. While Zelensky has Europe in the palm of his hand, the British Prime Minister seems to have the Ukrainian leader in his.

The BBC has become the propaganda arm of the Ukrainian government, acting virtually as Kiev's ministry of information in the West. It has played a sinister role in cultivating a false view that prolongs the war by pretending that Ukraine is winning it. The BBC has done this by presenting the Kremlin's objectives in grandiose terms which it pretends the Russian army has been frustrated/defeated in achieving. It has knowingly exaggerated Ukrainian successes that are minuscule and inconsequential and on the periphery of the main conflict zone to give the impression of continued victories. It has, at the same time, left the serious losses and reverses that Ukrainian forces are increasingly suffering on the ground go unreported.

All in all, the BBC has cynically done everything it could to encourage the Ukrainians to fight and die so as to kill as many Russians as possible. Its role in the conflict has been both contemptible and despicable.

A number of theories have been put forward for the British assertiveness in Ukraine. One suggests that it was a useful distraction for the under-pressure Johnson government embroiled in "partygate" and having to answer for the serious failings and high UK death toll of the covid crisis. Some say it is all part of a leadership contest, between Truss, Wallace and others smelling Johnson's blood and jostling for position by trumping each other through bellicose statements over Ukraine.

Another theory is that it is Britain's attempt to continue to fight the historic battle against the Europeans through the Ukraine war, which is opportunistically being used to implode the German economy and French diplomacy/prestige by allying with the hate-filled Eastern European Russophobes, in order to disable the EU.

The British have even established a Joint Expeditionary Force, a Nato-aligned, non-EU military grouping embracing the UK, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Netherlands which gives the UK a military expression in Europe on the premise that "defence" is now a necessity against the marauding Russians. This is the same Russian army that has supposedly been defeated by Ukrainian resistance in Kiev and Kharkov, but which, any day, may suddenly invade Europe. The "European army" that the EU talked about for years, but never managed to organise, is now being led by Brexit Britain!

However, there is evidence that there is more to it than all that. From before the Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine the UK was clearly projecting itself, unshackled from the EU through Brexit, as Global Britain, with a new ambitious agenda in the world that involved it in Ukraine and fishing in troubled waters in the Black Sea.

## The Black Sea Incident of June 2021

Britain was involved in one of the most provocative incidents during the period before the current war of 2022.

On 23 June 2021 the UK signed an agreement to support the enhancement of Ukrainian naval capabilities on the Black Sea. In this agreement, signed onboard HMS Defender, which was in Odesa as part of the Carrier Strike Group deployment, the UK, Ukraine and British private companies agreed to collaborate to boost Ukraine's naval capabilities. The British warship was in the Black Sea ahead of the Sea Breeze naval exercise set to take place over 2 weeks from June 28. Co-hosted by the US and Ukrainian navy, it involved 32 countries, 5,000 troops, 32 ships, 40 aircraft and 18 special operations units. The Kremlin called upon the US to cancel the exercise, warning of an inadvertent military confrontation.

Onboard HMS Defender were senior Ukrainian and British government officials, including Ukraine's Deputy Minister of Defense and the British Minister for Defence Procurement. They signed a major bilateral naval agreement providing for substantial military aid by Britain for the Ukrainian navy and the creation of new naval bases in the Black Sea.

Contractual work was begun on the sale and delivery of missiles; integration on new and in-service Ukrainian Navy patrol and airborne platforms, including a training and engineering support package; the development and joint production of eight fast missile warships; the creation of a new naval base on the Black Sea as the primary fleet base for Ukraine and a new base on the Sea of Azov; the sale of two refurbished Royal Navy Sandown class mine countermeasure vessels to Ukraine and a further project to deliver a modern frigate capability to Kiev.

The context of the subsequent Black Sea confrontation that occurred between Britain and Russia is significant: In February 2021, the Ukrainian government had announced plans to "recover Crimea" as well as the Donbass. In May, NATO staged the large Defender 2021 exercise in the Balkans and Black Sea region, which involved non-NATO members Ukraine and



Georgia. Under these conditions, the actions of the British ship HMS Defender had the character of a provocation.

On the same day as the signing of the military agreement between Britain and Ukraine HMS Defender undertook “a freedom of navigation patrol” through the disputed waters around the Crimean Peninsula. The Russian Ministry of Defence said they fired warning shots from coast guard patrol ships and dropped bombs from an attack aircraft in the path of Defender after the British warship had strayed for about 20 minutes as far as 3 km into waters off the coast of Crimea, which Russia had annexed in 2014.

There was a BBC TV crew and a *Daily Mail* reporter on board the British warship suggesting the voyage of the Defender was a deliberate, stage-managed act of provocation by the British government in full knowledge of the reaction it would produce from the Russians. According to British government planning documents reportedly found at a bus stop in Kent and subsequently leaked to the BBC, the decision for the HMS Defender to travel this particular route rather than a course that took it farther away from Crimea, outside of disputed waters, was made at the highest levels of British government. It was presumably believed in London that there would be an international incident and this would highlight British support for Ukraine.

US reconnaissance aircraft were also operating in conjunction with the British action. Speaking during a live call-in show, Vladimir Putin said that the US was monitoring the Russian response to the British destroyer.

During his annual televised call-in show on June 30, Putin described the incident as a provocation that brought confrontation between the West and Russia to a new level. He stated that Russians “*are fighting for ourselves and our future on our own territory. It was not us who covered thousands of kilometres by air and sea towards them; it was them who approached our borders and entered our territorial sea...*” Russian officials threatened that if a Western warship entered Russian waters again, it could be fired on.

An obscure incident in the Black Sea in October 1914 widened the European war of August into the Ottoman Empire, effectively beginning the Great War.

## Global Britain and the Black Sea

What was Britain up to, stirring up trouble with Russia in the Black Sea?

‘*Global Britain and the Black Sea region*’ is a policy document issued recently by the Council for Geostrategy. It is signed off by Sir Michael Fallon (UK Secretary of State for Defence, 2014-2017) who introduces it in the following passage:

“The Black Sea matters to us and to wider Euro-Atlantic security. Long before the renewed invasion of Ukraine last month, Russian aggression in the region began in Chechnya, continued with the invasion of Georgia (2008), and then the seizure of Crimea and the insurrection in the Donbas (2014). I was the first British defence secretary to have to respond to this new area of threat: I sent the British Army in to train the Ukrainian forces, and I deployed the Royal Air Force for the first time to conduct air policing from Romania. Our Royal Navy destroyers also began a series of visits to Black Sea ports. We worked to persuade the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) that its southeastern quadrant was just as vulnerable as the Baltic states further north.”

The Council for Geostrategy is a British foreign affairs think tank, recently established by James Rogers and Viktorija Starych Samuoliene, who both held positions at the neo-con Henry Jackson Society. The Henry (‘Scoop’) Jackson Society is an influential international think tank which had a programme of smashing up and re-ordering the Muslim world among other things.

The Council for Geostrategy is a British development from the Henry Jackson Society combining hostility toward Russia and China with a universalising environmental agenda directed against those two countries, as fossil fuel provider and user. It is what is known as an insider interest group, having direct access to the British Parliament and Government, and frequently has given “evidence” to UK Select Committees engaged in the formation of policy.

The Council for Geostrategy’s initial policy statement, ‘A Crowe Memorandum for the twenty-first century’ is written by Rogers and Alexander Lanoszka, Ernest Bevin Associate Fellow in Euro-Atlantic Geopolitics at the Council on Geostrategy. It is signed off by Tom Tugendhat, former British military and Chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee.

It is another example of how collaboration between Russophobe Eastern European academics and ex-British military figures is beginning to shape UK foreign policy in a similar way to what has occurred in the United States.

The Council for Geostrategy’s policy statement argues for “*a robust deterrence strategy*” aimed at “*authoritarian powers*” like Russia and China, and “*expansion of the geographic vision of the free and open international order*” and “*assertion of red lines unflinchingly*”.

It calls for a more robust and assertive British foreign policy based on the 1907 thoughts of Eyre Crowe, the hawkish senior officer in Sir Edward Grey’s Foreign Office:

“In December 2020, General Sir Nicholas Carter, the Chief

of the Defence Staff, stated during his annual lecture at the Royal United Services Institute that the democracies needed a new ‘Long Telegram’ – à la George Kennan – to help them deal with a more volatile and competitive world. However, the Long Telegram was written at a time when the Soviet Union had expanded due to the Second World War. It was a different sort of power than the authoritarian powers the world is now starting to face. A better strategic document might be Sir Eyre Crowe’s famous Memorandum of 1907, which is said to have influenced the thinking of the then Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. In a nutshell, Sir Eyre argued that Britain had to deter threats to the peace in Europe and could not isolate itself or act as an impartial bystander when weaker nations came under threat. His strategy is better for our times – times of growing great power competition.”

George Kennan’s containment strategy is rejected in favoured of Eyre Crowe’s preventative doctrine: “*Sir Eyre drafted his memo to deal with a rapidly expanding terrestrial power, while Kennan drafted his telegram to deal with one that had already become highly over-extended – a consequence of the Second World War.*”

This is further explained:

“This ‘*New Crowe Memo*’ is offered to the UK... to help generate a new geostrategic approach fit for the twenty-first century. The biggest challenge facing... countries is authoritarian revisionism, which aims to alter or spoil the prevailing geopolitical order. Since the end of the Second World War, free and open nations, such as the UK, the US,



Canada, Australia, Japan, and certain European countries, have put this order together. The twentieth century showed that deterrence works more effectively than accommodation or acquiescence; whereas the leading democracies failed to prevent German revisionism in the early twentieth century, they successfully stood up to the Soviet Union. Today, the free and open international order needs their support – from both sides of Eurasia – to withstand China and Russia’s malign and revisionist pressure.”

Eyre Crowe’s ‘*Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany*’ of 1 January 1907 can quite reasonably be seen as part of Britain’s Balance of Power re-orientation that led to World War less than 8 years later. In it Crowe, reminded the British Foreign Secretary of the traditional Balance of Power policy which made it imperative that Britain combat the rise of Germany before it was too late. Crowe made it clear to his boss that whatever Germany’s intention, pacific or warlike, commercial or military, it did not matter. There should be no Liberal sensibilities about confronting a threat with war if necessary. Britain was prone to accommodate and appease. However, if any Power crossed British Imperial red lines it needed to be stopped and cut down to size.

In a significant passage Crowe wrote:

“It might be deduced that the, antagonism is too deeply rooted in the relative position of the two countries to allow of its being bridged over by the kind of temporary expedients to which England has so long and so patiently resorted. On this view of the case it would have to be assumed that Germany is deliberately following a policy which is essentially opposed to vital British interests, and that an armed conflict cannot in the long run be averted, except by England either sacrificing those interests, with the result that she would lose her position as an independent Great Power, or making herself too strong to give Germany the chance of succeeding in a war. This is the opinion of those who, see in the whole, trend of Germany’s policy conclusive evidence that she is consciously aiming at the establishment of a German hegemony, at first in Europe, and eventually in the world.”

Britain needed to organise a coalition of countries, in the cause of humanity, to defend the world order that Britain had created and was predominant within.

And the parallels with England/Germany in the decade prior to the Great War seem to be what now interest the promoters of Global Britain in relation to Russia and China.

## Russia Trespasses on British interests

The 2022 ‘*Global Britain*’ and the *Black Sea region*’ policy document is firmly rooted in the British sea power narrative. It outlines Britain’s historic and “*integral*” geopolitical interest in the Black Sea, which the adjacent power, Russia, is now trespassing on:

“As an insular ‘*seapower state*’ adjacent to the European continent and dependent on access to its surrounding seas, the UK’s enduring geostrategic interest has been to uphold openness, both internationally and at sea. Since most global trade occurs by sea, an open international order, alongside freedom of navigation, allows an archipelagic trade-oriented economy such as Britain’s to flourish because it creates predictability and reduces the risk of predation.

Alternatively, large continental powers often seek to do the opposite: by ‘continentalising’ maritime spaces, they can reduce the influence of maritime powers or extract tribute when their ships pass into waters continental states claim as their own. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Britain identified the Black Sea region as integral to British interests: initially, because it provided a sea route to Persia that bypassed the Russian-controlled Caucasus; later, because, with the construction of the Suez Canal, the Black Sea could be used to exert pressure on the ‘Royal Route’ to the Middle East, Asia and Oceania.

Yet the geography of the Black Sea, which is sandwiched between Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East, and practically enclosed except for the narrow Dardanelles and Bosphorus, encourages geopolitical rivalry. Turkey and Russia both border the Black Sea, and the UK’s pervasive maritime presence, essential to uphold the openness of all European seas, substantiates competition. These three major powers have regularly fought one another to control access. In 1806, Britain warred with the Ottoman Empire to prevent France from closing the Black Sea, and in 1841 agreed to the London Straits Convention – closing the Dardanelles to all ships, including those from countries allied to the Ottoman Empire – out of fear that the Ottomans were incapable of ensuring the Black Sea remained open. Rivalry between Russia and the UK in the Black Sea has also been intense, culminating in the 1853-1856 Crimean War.

The opening of the Suez Canal – establishing the ‘*Royal Route*’ – only accentuated the Black Sea’s significance in the UK’s geostrategic calculus; any country lording over the region would be able to push down into the Eastern Mediterranean, potentially threatening the UK’s newfound economic lifeline. Early in the 20th century, however, Britain’s naval reach began to wane as the Soviet Union and Turkey emerged. Turkey thwarted the Gallipoli Campaign during the First World War. At the same time, the encroachment of Soviet continental power – particularly during and after the Second World War – eventually encased the Black Sea on three sides. Only through Turkey’s inclusion in NATO in 1952, which the UK came to support, was access upheld.

Despite falling tensions in the Black Sea after the Cold War, the Kremlin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 gave way to a new round of ‘*continentalisation*’. Under cover of the Minsk Accords – from inception ‘*a rotting corpse slumped over the conference table*’ – Russia consolidated control over Crimea and the Donbas. The Kremlin developed sly ‘*boa constrictor*’-like tactics to close off the Sea of Azov and nearby maritime spaces, allowing it to extend Russian influence over the Black Sea. In turn, the Kremlin’s hand grew stronger in the Caucasus, thus putting more pressure on Georgia, as well as the Eastern Mediterranean, where Russia enjoyed a freer hand to meddle in Syria.

A strengthened Russia in the Black Sea region gains additional significance due to HM Government’s ambitions in the Integrated Review to ‘*tilt*’ to the Indo-Pacific, where the UK aims to be ‘*the European partner with the broadest and most integrated presence*’ in the Indo-Pacific zone by 2030. First, any power dominant in the Black Sea region would have extensive influence over the Eastern Mediterranean, which hosts British military facilities, and the critical ‘*Royal Route*’. Second, as competition between the United States (US) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) intensifies, the US will likely refine its Euro-Atlantic commitments in order to allocate more resources to the Indo-Pacific. Underwriting Black Sea security will become more of a task for, and thus much more significant to, the UK.

Should Russia be allowed to consolidate its position in the Black Sea region, it would almost certainly strengthen its

reach into the Eastern Mediterranean, potentially threatening key NATO allies' interests in the Indo-Pacific, not least those of the UK. At the very least, NATO allies have a clear interest in preventing the Black Sea from becoming a Russian 'lake' or a Chinese franchise. Besides being connected to the Mediterranean Sea, developments in and around the Black Sea also bear on the Baltic Sea, not least as any failure on NATO's part to show resolution in resisting Russian adventurism in one region may encourage challenges in the other."

It was Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) who ended British interference in the Black Sea a century ago this year. He did this in alliance with Bolshevik Russia as part of the Turkish war of independence that defeated Britain at Chanak in October 1922 - the catastrophic event for the British Empire that threw Prime Minister Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, Lord Curzon and "the men who won the war" out of power. And around the same time Boris Johnson's Ottoman grandfather, Ali Kemal, was hung as a collaborator with the British occupation in Istanbul.

Successful British meddling in the Black Sea, which disrupts the existing regional balance, undoubtedly spells potential instability for states like Turkey, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Expect Colour Revolution agitation to increasingly come onto the agenda if the West gets a foothold in the region.

Is Europe aware that the conflict in Ukraine is being urged on Kiev and fuelled by Britain not just as a geopolitical war against Russia but as part of a new British Imperialist project to recapture global influence on the coat tails of the United States?

Even if it is, it seems that Europe is incapable of extricating itself from the position of subservience it has come to occupy in relation to Johnson and Zelensky within the great moral war over Ukraine.

It should be noted that it was a long-standing policy objective of maritime Britain to confine Russia to the continental sphere by denying it a warm water port, be that in the Mediterranean or the Pacific. The refrain of the famous "Jingo War Song" was "The Russians shall not have Constantinople!" and Britain was prepared to go to war to prevent that development. Russia was to be contained within the Black Sea and obstructed by the Straits. The objective today seems to be to deny the Black Sea completely to Russia and prevent its use of Sevastopol by making sure Crimea is included in Ukraine. The British insistence in providing the Ukrainians with sophisticated anti-ship missiles is an indication of the importance of denying the waters of the Black Sea to the Russians.

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## Clash of Civilisations in Ukraine

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By Pat Walsh

Samuel P. Huntington's '*The Clash of Civilisations and the Making of the World Order*' originally appeared in article form in the illustrious *Foreign Affairs* periodical in 1993. The initial article generated more discussion in the United States than anything written since World War Two and it was expanded into a famous book by the author, to explain himself more fully. The book, which appeared in 1996 became a classic text of international affairs and US foreign policy. It is still as famous 30 years on than it was at the time of its original publication. And what it said about Ukraine and the West's relations with Russia should now be of great interest.

For one thing it gives us a good idea where things went wrong and how the current tragedy was produced in Ukraine that threatens to become a world war. If Western leaders, from Clinton to Obama to Biden, had taken care to understand the argument in Huntington's *Clash of Civilisations* they would have known never to have meddled in Ukraine. Alternatively, if they had read and understood it they stand condemned for knowing rightly what they were going to produce for its people and wider humanity.

(I exclude President Donald Trump from such criticism. The world's media has given us a picture of him as an ignorant buffoon. He can, therefore, be exempt from possessing the dangerous knowledge that book reading would have given an ordinary president. He apparently conducted foreign policy through mere common sense and realism and proved incapable of war making, unlike his learned predecessors and successor. He was a rogue president in all senses of the word.)

### The Clash of Civilisations

'*The Clash of Civilisations*' was an interpretation of global politics after the Cold War had ended in a US victory and the world lay open to what America wished to do with it as sole

surviving superpower following the Soviet Union's internal collapse.

Huntington's book is often characterised as a kind of programme for an inevitable clash of civilisations. It was not that at all. But the globalising rage of the 1990s seems to have found the discovery and existence of distinct civilisations in the world, as opposed to a single universalising superior one, which put all humanity on its single path to progress, objectionable. The pretence was adopted that different and distinct civilisations were a bad thing which might lead to war if resistance was put up to their absorption by the one which had assumed predominance by winning the Cold War.

*The Clash of Civilisations* recognised that global politics was ceasing to be bipolar and becoming multipolar and multi-civilisational; the West was, at the moment of its great victory, in comparative decline as against Asia: a civilisational world order was developing and the West's universalist pretensions would increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilisations, if it attempted world hegemony without consideration for other cultures.

Huntington put it like this:

"The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilisation as unique, not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilisations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multi civilisational character of global politics." (p.20-1)

In summary, Huntington saw that there existed distinct civilisational spheres of influence in the world. The West, whilst consolidating its own distinct sphere, needed to know

Western  
Christianity  
since 1500

Orthodox  
Christianity  
and Islam





and understand the limits of its particular and unique sphere, respect the spheres of other civilisations and develop functional and accommodationist relations with other civilisations to maintain the peace in order to prevent World War Three.

When Huntington was writing Russia was under Boris Yeltsin and it was effectively down and out. Huntington anticipated therefore that the potential major clash of civilisations would be between the West, tempted to expand its civilisational sphere at the moment of victory, and the distinctly Muslim world, in the short-term. But in the longer term it would come up against China, and its ancient and substantial civilisation.

However, Huntington was conscious of the West's unfinished business with regard to Russia and he addressed the important issues of the expansion of NATO, the Russian civilisational sphere of influence and the part of Ukraine within it, as a borderland between the West and Russia.

*The Clash of Civilisations* appeared at a particular moment of time when the US as hegemon was faced with deciding how it would deal with the rest of the world. Huntington was aware that the West would attempt to universalise itself through American power and try to impose its values and political and economic system on the rest of humanity. He argued that this would be a mistake and would inevitably lead to world conflict as other civilisations resisted the Western embrace. It was not just a question of authoritarian governments resisting US style liberal democracy. Much more was at stake than that in the Clash of Civilisations.

## Western and NATO expansion

Huntington argued that establishing where Europe ended was one of the principal challenges confronting the West in the post-Cold War world:

"With the collapse of communism... it became necessary to confront and answer the question: What is Europe?" (p.158)

Europe's boundaries on its north, south and west were clear, being delineated by substantial bodies of water. The problem lay to the east:

"... where is Europe's eastern boundary? Who should be thought of as European and hence as potential members of the European Union, NATO, and comparable organisations?" (p.158)

It was clear that the West did not regard Russia as part of Western civilisation and showed little interest in welcoming it into its ranks. Neither did Huntington feel that Russia could be absorbed. It was distinct.

His answer to the question of where Europe ended and Russia began is contained in the following passage:

"The most compelling and pervasive answer... is provided by the great historical line that has existed for centuries separating Western Christian peoples from Muslim and Orthodox peoples". This line dates back to the Roman Empire in the fourth century and the creation of the Holy Roman Empire in the tenth century. It has been in roughly its current place for at least five hundred years." (p.158)

As shown on a map **on the previous page**, reproduced from *The Clash of Civilisations*, the frontiers of Europe ran to the east of Finland, the Baltic states, through the middle of

Belarus, Ukraine and Romania, and skirted east of Croatia in the Balkans, coinciding with the historical division between the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires.

Huntington noted that there was a clear distinction between Central Europe or Mitteleuropa, which was historically part of Western civilisation, and which should be reclaimed, and Eastern Europe proper, which was part of a different Eastern civilisation and should not:

"It is the cultural border of Europe, and in the post-Cold War world it is also the political and economic border of Europe and the West... Europe ends where Western Christianity ends and Islam and Orthodoxy begin... It is necessary, as Michael Howard (prominent British Conservative) argued, to recognise the distinction, blurred during the Soviet years, between Central Europe or Mitteleuropa and Eastern Europe proper... The term 'Eastern Europe' should be reserved for those regions which developed under the aegis of the Orthodox Church and... only emerged from Ottoman domination in the nineteenth century..." (pp.159-160)

Huntington treats the European Union and NATO as parallel organisations of Western Christian civilisation which, since the end of the Cold War, have been expanding into the space in Eastern Europe evacuated by the Soviet Union. He saw the EU as "*coextensive with Western Christian civilisation as it has historically existed in Europe.*" (p.161)

Huntington then discussed NATO expansionism in *The Clash of Civilisations*. He advocated further expansion up to what are understood to be the boundaries of Western civilisation because "*NATO is the security organisation of Western civilisation.*" (p.161)

He argued that

"With the Cold War over, NATO has one central and compelling purpose: to insure that it remains over by preventing the reimposition of Russian political and military control in Central Europe. As the West's security organisation NATO is appropriately open to membership by Western countries which wish to join ..." (p.161)

Huntington while noting that "*Russia vigorously opposed any NATO expansion*" (p.161) emphasised importantly that:

"NATO expansion limited to countries historically part of Western Christendom... guarantees to Russia that it would exclude Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine as long as Ukraine remained united. NATO expansion limited to Western states would also underline Russia's role as the core state of a separate, Orthodox civilisation, and hence a country which should be responsible for order within and along the boundaries of Orthodoxy." (p.162)

So *The Clash of Civilisations* is keen to stress that whilst NATO expansion was desirable and justifiable in relation to consolidating the area historically regarded as that of Western Christian civilisation it was not desirable or justifiable beyond that. Encroachment into an area that was clearly part of another and distinct civilisation would be a recipe for conflict. The West could not have it both ways - if Russia was a distinct power and civilisation it had its own civilisational sphere of influence which should be taken account of and not trespassed upon. If that were not the case Russia should be welcomed fully into the organisations of Western civilisation, like the EU and NATO.

Huntington understood that there was a clear division between the sphere of Western Christian civilisation and that of Eastern Orthodox civilisation. Only three states were problematic with regard to the demarcation: Greece and Turkey, both did not easily sit within the West. Turkey was western purely because of Atatürk and the Cold War. Greece was an anomaly. The most important problem was Ukraine, “*the borderlands*”, which was a “*cleft country*” down which the boundary between West and East actually ran.

Huntington saw that Ukraine could only be an integral part of Western civilisation if it were partitioned along the Dneiper with the Western half seceding from the Eastern Russian part in order to join the EU or NATO. He produced electoral maps that clearly demonstrated the civilisational division within the Ukrainian state, which had come about only through Soviet nation-building. Huntington emphasised that if the country wished to maintain the territory the Soviet Union had provided for it, Ukraine had to maintain a careful balance between two civilisations in which Russian interests were guaranteed by any government in Kiev. If not territorial integrity would become problematic as a matter of course, due to the civilisational cleft which cut the state in two.

## Russia and Ukraine

Huntington acknowledged the Russia that remained in the 1990s as the “*successor to the tsarist and communist empires*” and as “*a civilisational bloc, paralleling in many respects that of the West in Europe.*” (p.163) Russia formed an “*Orthodox heartland*” with Belarus, Moldova, Armenia and Kazakhstan (40 per cent Russian) according to Huntington. He saw Ukraine and Georgia as civilisationally part of this Orthodox bloc, but problematic components due to their “*strong senses of national identity*”. Armenia also had a very well developed sense of nationalism but its antagonisms with Muslim neighbours tended to make it a dependency of Moscow.

Huntington was proved right to foresee trouble ahead in relation to Ukraine. In April 2008, at the Bucharest summit, the NATO countries welcomed Georgia’s and Ukraine’s “*Euro-Atlantic aspirations*” and announced their intention to bring both countries into the Membership Application Plan and toward full NATO membership and joining the Western civilisational bloc. Russia had by then swallowed two earlier NATO enlargements, including two of the Orthodox civilisational counties, Bulgaria and Romania’s entry in 2004, and was appalled by this. It was a step too far for Moscow and Georgia was defeated in a brief war that same year, in August 2008, losing territory (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) as a consequence.

Huntingdon noted that most of Ukraine, since 1654, barring a brief period between 1917 and 1920, had been part of the Russian political orbit and Orthodox world:

“Ukraine, however, is a cleft country with two distinct cultures. The civilisational fault line between the West and Orthodoxy runs through its heart and has done so for centuries. At times in the past, western Ukraine was part of Poland, Lithuania, and the Austro-Hungarian empire. A large portion of its population have been adherents of the Uniate Church which practices Orthodox rites but acknowledges the authority of the Pope. Historically, western Ukrainians have spoken Ukrainian and have been strongly nationalist in their outlook. The people of eastern Ukraine, on the other hand, have been overwhelmingly Orthodox and have in large part spoken Russian... The Crimea is overwhelmingly Russian and was part of the Russian

Federation until 1954, when Khrushchev transferred it to Ukraine...” (p.166)

Because of the civilisational cleft within Ukraine, Huntington saw different possibilities for the development of Ukrainian/Russian relations. He outlined three possible futures:

A first possibility was that relations would remain close and generally fraternal due to cultural and historical ties. Huntington explained:

“These are two Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who have had close relationships for centuries and between whom intermarriage is common. Despite highly contentious issues and the pressure of extreme nationalists on both sides, the leaders of both countries worked hard and largely successfully to moderate these disputes.” (p.167)

A second and more likely development, thought Huntington, was that Ukraine would ultimately split apart “*along its fault line into two separate entities, the eastern which would merge with Russia.*”

He noted that

“a rump Uniate and Western-oriented Ukraine, however, would only be viable if it had strong and effective Western support.” (p.167)

Huntington then described how Ukraine had only barely managed to maintain its Soviet borders since independence, through wise and careful statesmanship and good relations with Moscow. The Crimea parliament had voted to declare independence in May 1992 but under Ukrainian pressure rescinded the vote. In 1994 Crimea elected a president who had campaigned for unity with Russia. He subsequently backed away from his commitment to hold a referendum on independence after negotiations with Kiev. In May 1994 the Crimea parliament voted to restore the 1992 constitution that meant virtually independence from Kiev. But subsequent restraint of Ukrainian and Russian leaders led to an accommodation that preserved Crimea as part of the Ukrainian state. It was understood that Crimea also had implications for Donbas, where a further Ukrainian Russian population required careful consideration by Kiev.

Huntington concluded optimistically that

“only if relations between the West and Russia deteriorated seriously and came to resemble those of the Cold War” would cleft Ukraine break apart to join each’s civilisational blocs. (p.167)

The third and most likely scenario Huntington put forward for the country in *The Clash of Civilisations* was that

“Ukraine will remain united, remain cleft, remain independent, and generally cooperate closely with Russia... facilitated by a partially shared culture and close personal ties.” (p.168)

Interestingly, Huntington contrasted his civilisational approach with the realist/statist approach of John Mearsheimer, which was later to come to the fore with the events of 2014:

“A statist paradigm... leads John Mearsheimer to predict that “the situation between Ukraine and Russia is ripe for the

outbreak of security competition between them. Great Powers that share a long and unprotected common border, like that between Russia and Ukraine, often lapse into competition driven by security fears. Russia and Ukraine might overcome this dynamic and learn to live together in harmony, but it would be unusual if they do.”

While a statist approach highlights the possibility of a Russian-Ukrainian war, a civilisational approach minimises that and highlights the possibility of Ukraine splitting in half, a separation which cultural factors would lead one to predict might be more violent than Czechoslovakia, but far less bloody than Yugoslavia. These different predictions, in turn give rise to differing policy priorities. Mearsheimer’s statist prediction of possible war and Russian conquest of Ukraine leads him to support Ukraine having nuclear weapons. A civilisational approach would encourage cooperation between Russia and Ukraine, urge Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons, promote substantial economic assistance and other measures to help maintain Ukrainian unity and independence, and sponsor contingency planning for the possible break up of Ukraine.” (p.37)

It seems that there was substantial knowledge available to Western leaders then, about the internal divisions in Ukraine that might result in its breakup if statecraft was not handled carefully by Ukrainian leaders, and, on the other hand, the friction that existed in relations between an independent Ukraine with Soviet borders and Russia, that might lead to future war.

But it appears that both the EU and NATO’s appetite for eastern expansion was insatiable.

The West, instead of heeding the advice from either Samuel Huntington or John Mearsheimer, appears to have pursued Fukuyama’s “*End of History*” globalising utopian illusion. This brought them to recklessly interfere in Ukraine, where Russia’s security fears were greatest, to create the worst possible outcome for both countries and peoples.

### Where did it all go wrong?

The clash of civilisations in Ukraine could have been avoided if Presidents Obama and Biden had read and heeded the arguments presented in *The Clash of Civilisations*.

So where did it all go wrong for Ukraine and the clash of civilisations head toward a potential world war?

When President Clinton visited Europe in January 1994 he stated that

“Freedom’s boundaries now should be defined by new behaviour, not by old history. I say to all who would draw a new line in Europe: we should not foreclose the possibility of... democracy everywhere, market economics everywhere, countries cooperating for mutual security everywhere. We must guard against a lesser outcome.”

It was this universalising tendency within the “*indispensable nation*” that did for the strategy advocated in *The Clash of Civilisations* to maintain peace in the world and prevent global conflict.

It is quite clear that the 2014 Maidan coup, instigated by the EU and US, unbalanced the civilisational equilibrium within Ukraine by attempting something not imagined as a possibility by Huntington. In this coup Western Ukrainian nationalists overthrew the elected government in Kiev, which was attempting to maintain the equilibrium within Ukraine, necessary to holding the state together, and proceeded to attempt to impose itself on the Eastern Russian Ukraine. This

was attempted first politically by the coup government in Kiev in repressing the Russian language and culture of the east and then militarily by treating the population as terrorists. This upset the civilisational equilibrium within Ukraine and led to civil conflict and the breakaway of the Russian/Orthodox regions of Crimea, and parts of Luhansk and Donetsk.

Joe Biden cannot have been unaware of *The Clash of Civilisations* argument. It was, after all, the most discussed article and book in recent times in the United States.

At a joint press conference with Hungary’s Premier, Victor Orban, on February 1 2022, a few weeks before the war, President Putin emphasised that “*fundamental Russian concerns*” were being ignored by the West in Ukraine. Asked how he would respond to this situation, Putin made his position very clear:

“Listen attentively to what I am saying. It is written into Ukraine’s doctrines that it wants to take Crimea back, by force if necessary. This is not what Ukrainian officials say in public. This is written in their documents. Suppose Ukraine is a NATO member. It will be filled with weapons, modern offensive weapons will be deployed on its territory just like in Poland and Romania – who is going to prevent this. Suppose it starts operations in Crimea, not to mention Donbass. Crimea is sovereign Russian territory. We consider this matter settled. Imagine that Ukraine is a NATO country and starts these military operations. What are we supposed to do? Fight against the NATO bloc? Has anyone given at least some thought to this? Apparently not.”

Around 1900 Joseph Chamberlain proposed the consolidation of the British Empire into a great tariff union. However, the Liberal Imperialists shot down his proposal for consolidation and went for expansion instead. This led to the First World War. It appears something similar happened one hundred years later.

President Biden’s support for Kiev’s sovereign right to spread NATO into the Russian/Orthodox sphere of influence within Ukraine, and up to the walls of the Russian heartland itself, can only be seen as the primary reason for the conflict in Ukraine and the increasing possibility of world war. The Russian Special Military Operation/invasion was a consequence of that, and not a cause of the conflict, which had began in 2013/4 with EU/US meddling along the civilisational fault lines of Ukraine.

From his *Clash of Civilisation* analysis in the 1990s Huntington proposed that an understanding be reached between the West and Russia to avoid future war in relation to Ukraine, involving:

“1. Russian acceptance of the expansion of the European Union and NATO to include the Western Christian states of Central and Eastern Europe, and Western commitment not to expand NATO further, unless Ukraine splits into two parts.

2.. a partnership treaty between Russia and NATO pledging non-aggression, regular consultations on security issues, cooperative efforts to avoid arms competition, and negotiation of arms control agreements appropriate to their post-Cold War security needs.” (p.242)

Huntington’s proposal in the 1990s, which was ignored by the West in its *Drang nach Osten*, may now, however, prove useful as a basis for peace in Ukraine and between the West and Russia. But before that can happen the Ukraine government will have to agree to the partition of its state along civilisational lines, which their intransigence toward their Russian-orientated citizens and the Russian Special Military Operation has resulted in. And the West will have to end its expansionism to the East and respect the fact that it has over-reached itself by intruding into a civilisational bloc where it can cause nothing but conflict.

Or alternatively the highest stakes can be played for and the conflict played out to the full.



## Ukraine and the Russian Orthodox Church

By Peter Brooke

Substance of a talk given in Brecon, May 3rd 2022. Please note that I follow no consistent system of transliterating Russian or Ukrainian names into the Latin alphabet. Names in anything I write in this area should be understood as hopefully recognisable symbols of the persons and places etc. they represent.

**MAP 1 A Frontier Between Civilisations**




The word ‘*Ukraine*’, as I’m sure everyone knows by now, means ‘*frontier*’ or border country. The border in question was the country that separates Poland, Russia and the Crimean Tatars. The Poles were Catholic, the Russians Orthodox. The Tatars were the descendants of the religiously eclectic Mongol ‘*Golden Horde*’, which had swept through the whole area in the thirteenth century but had since allied with the Ottoman Empire and therefore represent Islam.

Hopefully you can discern at the centre of map 1 the frontier as it was in the late seventeenth century. Had I shown a map from earlier in the seventeenth century, the line would have been further to the East. ‘*Poland*’ would have been bigger. But I chose this map because it shows the wider area - the relationship

to Constantinople in the South and to the Baltic region in the North. The line of the frontier shown here coincides roughly with the ‘*Varangian route*’ - the trade route that ran from the Baltic, the Scandinavian countries, in the North to the Black Sea in the South, which explains the importance of the city of Kiev, which also lay on the trade route from East to West, from Asia to Europe.

Both Ukrainians and Russians claim descent from the tenth century Kingdom of Rus, centred on Kiev. The Kingdom lasted as a cultural unity for some three hundred years but had a tendency to break up into smaller, more or less allied principalities.

MAP 2




In this map, one could see in Novgorod and Vladimir in the North the seedbed of what was to become Russia and, in the West, in Galicia/Volhynia, the seedbed of what was to become modern Ukraine. Note that the actual coastal area of both the Black and Azov seas were out of control of the Kievans as they would continue to be out of control of Poles, Lithuanians and Russians until the late eighteenth century.

Kiev had adopted Orthodoxy from Constantinople in 988. Poland in the West had adopted Catholicism from Rome in 966. Although the formal date given for the Great Schism between Rome and Constantinople, Catholicism and Orthodoxy, is 1054, the difference between them was already deeply felt.

Kievan Rus was submerged in the great wave of the invasion by the Golden Horde in the thirteenth century.

MAP 3



Kiev was sacked and its population massacred in 1240. As a result the Metropolitan of Kiev transferred, first (1299) to Vladimir, then (1326) to Moscow while still retaining 'Kiev' in his title. In the same year (1240) as the sack of Kiev, a young prince in Novgorod, Alexander, won the battle of the Neva against the Swedes, thus earning the name Alexander Nevski. This, together with the subsequent victory over the Teutonic Knights in 1242, was a civilisational choice. Alexander had accepted submission to the Tatars in preference to incorporation into the Catholic West. A similar choice was made by the Galician-Volhynian Prince, Daniel Romanovich, on the advice of the then Metropolitan of Kiev and against the appeals of the Pope. He was the founder of the town of Lviv. But in 1340,

about the time of the Battle of Kulikovo when the Muscovites broke free of the Tatar yoke, Galicia-Volhynia made an opposite choice. The last prince of Galicia-Volhynia, Yuri II Boleslav, was murdered, poisoned by his boyars. Galicia fell into disarray and was fought over by different Galician factions, Hungary and Poland until, through an agreement between Poland, Hungary and Lithuania, it was incorporated into Poland in 1387. After struggles with Poland, Lithuania gained control of Volhynia in 1370.

The Ukrainians could be described as those Orthodox descendants of Kievan Rus who came under Polish/Lithuanian domination, partly at least to protect themselves against the Tatars, still powerful in most of the area covered by modern Ukraine.





This map shows the area as it was in 1483. In the following, sixteenth, century, Novgorod and most of the territory covered by the khanates would come under Muscovy, led by the Grand Duke Ivan III and his son, the first 'Tsar', Ivan IV (the 'Terrible').<sup>1</sup>

### CATHOLIC AND ORTHODOX

Initially a distinction could be drawn between Poles and Lithuanians in that the Lithuanians, who had the larger territory - including, at least in theory, Kiev - were more tolerant of Orthodoxy. But there was a continual process of Polish-Lithuanian rapprochement encouraging an ever tighter identification with Catholicism. The pressure was felt especially by the Orthodox aristocracy. The advantages of conversion were

considerable, both materially in terms of political power and culturally, as Poland was open to the cultural and intellectual evolutions that were occurring in Europe. The peasantry on the other hand, and the artisan class, clung stubbornly to Orthodoxy. So an Orthodox peasantry was confronted with a Polish and increasingly 'Polonised' Ruthenian landlord class ('Ruthenian' - or 'Rusian' - being the term used to refer to former subjects of Kievan Rus). In addition, Poland had welcomed large numbers of Jews, fleeing persecution in Germany. For the Poles the Jews were useful to fulfil socially necessary tasks that were beneath the dignity of the noble class - merchant, tax collector, tavernkeeper, money lender, landlord's agent - all roles that made them very unpopular among the peasantry.

The peasants, however, had an escape route. They could flee westward into the area properly called the Ukraine, the borderlands, and join up with the Cossacks. A large territory to the South East of Poland, straddling the Dnieper river, was called the 'wildfields', the area of confrontation between Poland and the Tatars and with the Tatars, the Ottoman Empire. Poland

<sup>1</sup> The account of this early period is drawn from a variety of sources including different articles in the Encyclopedia of Ukraine (available online), Dmitri Pospelovsky's *The Orthodox Church in the history of Russia* and Ludmilla Liyaeva: *The Ukrainian Icon, 11th-18th centuries*.

was represented, in a manner of speaking by the Orthodox, Ruthenian speaking Cossacks.

I'm told that the word '*Cossack*' corresponds to a Turkish word, *kazakh*, as in Kazakhstan, meaning '*free man*', meaning that they weren't serfs. They were formed into self-defending military companies and from the early sixteenth century the Polish and Russian governments saw an advantage in their existence as a buffer against the Tatars. In 1526, the Polish government agreed to formally recognise the '*registered Cossacks*' as a rather unpredictable part of the Polish defence force. But there were also Cossacks in the area '*beyond the rapids*' - the '*Zaporizhia*' - wildest of the wild lands in the Southern area of the Dnieper river. These were unregistered and from the point of view of the Polish and Russian governments quite unpredictable.

Meanwhile, in the mid fifteenth century, Constantinople, like most of the rest of the Orthodox world, had succumbed to the Ottoman Empire. But before that, in an attempt to secure Catholic support against the Ottomans, the Patriarch of Constantinople, together with other leading Orthodox hierarchs including the now Moscow based Metropolitan of Kiev, had agreed in the Council of Florence-Ferrara, to a union with Rome. The result was a revolt both in Constantinople and in Moscow. Moscow broke the connection with Constantinople, dissolved the Kiev metropolitanate and created a new metropolitanate of Moscow. Constantinople in turn, now returned to Orthodoxy but under Ottoman domination, created a new Metropolitanate of Kiev, albeit, given the continued vulnerability of Kiev, based in Vilnius, capital of Lithuania.

On the one hand one could say that Moscow was now out of communion with the rest of the Orthodox world. On the other hand, Moscow was now the only remaining Orthodox state - all the other Orthodox communities were either subject to the Muslim Ottoman Empire or, in the case of the Ruthenians, to the Poles (Rumania, though incorporated into the Ottoman Empire still had a relatively high degree of autonomy). Moscow was brought back into the wider Orthodox family when Constantinople recognised the metropolitanate in 1589, allowing it the title of Patriarch. This was shortly after the death of Ivan IV, the '*Terrible*', and before the early seventeenth century invasion from Poland - the '*time of trouble*'.

### THE 'UNIATES' AND THE KIEV ACADEMY

As, in Poland, the Counter-Reformation got underway, and as they lost the protection of their own Ruthenian aristocracy, the pressure on the Orthodox clergy became ever harder to bear. As a result, a number of the higher clergy proposed joining the Catholic Church but being allowed to continue to use the Eastern liturgy and to have a married clergy - both necessary conditions for maintaining the loyalty of the peasantry. The result was the '*Union of Brest*' of 1596. Although they were destined to become an important force in Ukrainian history, their immediate situation was uncomfortable - regarded with suspicion by the Catholics and with positive hatred by the Orthodox.

Partly in response to the Uniates a very remarkable development occurred - the formation in 1632, under Cossack patronage, of the '*Greek Slavonic Academy*' of Kiev. The leading figure was a Moldavian nobleman who had become a monk in the Kiev Caves Monastery, Peter Moghila, who became Metropolitan of Kiev in 1633. This could be seen as the first modern theological school in the Russian world but although it was established as a bulwark for Orthodoxy, it was miles far removed from Orthodoxy as it was understood in Russia. And here we enter into a paradox of Catholic/Orthodox church history.

The Catholic West was fascinated by the classical thought and culture of Greece and Rome, hence Thomas Aquinas's

intensive use of Aristotle, but they had very little access to it. It was preserved in Constantinople but preserved, so to speak, in amber - regarded as a precious heritage from their ancestors which, nonetheless, had been superseded by Christianity. Plato and Aristotle were of interest for the purity of their language and as models for the process of reasoning but the actual philosophical questions they posed were now settled. By Christianity. So when Constantinople shared Christianity with the Slavs they didn't share their classical culture, whether because they thought the barbarians couldn't assume it or simply because they didn't think they needed it because they had something better.<sup>2</sup>

But with the decline and fall of Constantinople, a huge treasure trove of classical literature passed over to the West and was a major influence on the Renaissance and on its shadow twin, the Reformation. None of this affected Russia. Russian Orthodoxy could be called Christianity without Classicism. But it had a huge effect on Poland and consequently on Peter Moghila and his Kiev academy. From a Russian point of view the academy had a very Catholic character. The instruction was in Latin, the method Scholastic and such exotic things as philosophy, rhetoric, classical literature and poetics were taught. **REVOLTS IN THE WILD LANDS AND DOOR TO THE WEST IN RUSSIA**

On the face of it, it seems extraordinary that this academy should appear in the middle of what was effectively a sort of no-man's-land, but of course this meant that, although notionally on Polish territory it was out of reach of the Polish government. The period of the establishment of the academy was a period of extraordinary violence on the part of the Cossacks, beginning with a revolt in 1630 which I believe to have been the model for Nicolai Gogol's *Taras Bulba* as it is more definitely for *The Night of Taras*, a poem by the nineteenth century poet, Taras Shevchenko, generally recognised as Ukraine's national poet.<sup>3</sup> But it came to a climax with the revolt in 1648 associated with the name of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. This took the form of a massacre of Poles and Jews. It had a particularly traumatic effect on the Jews. It went far to destroy the privileged position Jews had held previously in Poland. It seems to have helped stimulate the messianic movement of Sabbatai Zevi. Some writers have suggested that the outpouring of sympathy it evoked among Jews worldwide marks the beginnings of a sense of Jewish nationhood.<sup>4</sup>

Among Ukrainian nationalists, Khmelnytsky has a mixed reputation. On the one hand, he created a state, the '*hetmanate*', which could be described as the first more or less independent Ukrainian state since the area had come under Polish-Lithuanian domination.

But in addition to founding the hetmanate, Khmelnytsky, in his war with the Poles, entered into an alliance with the Russians, at first with the Treaty of Pereislav of 1654, which was tightened by the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667. The three hundredth anniversary of the Treaty of Pereislav was celebrated in the Soviet Union in 1954 as the coming together of the two Russian peoples, Little Russians and Great Russians, on

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2 I discuss this in my essay Plato and Christianity - <http://www.peterbrooke.org/politics-and-theology/plato/east-and-west.html>

3 Readable English translations of Shevchenko's poetry - essential for understanding Ukrainian culture - can be found at <https://taras-shevchenko.storinka.org/> The '*Taras*' of Shevchenko's poem isn't the fictional Taras Bulba but the real historical figure of Hetman Taras Fedorovich, who led the 1630 rebellion.

4 I discuss this in a little more detail in my essay A Polish prologue, in the Solzhenitsyn series - <http://www.peterbrooke.org/politics-and-theology/solzhenitsyn/prologue/>

which occasion, as a token of their eternal friendship, Nikita Khrushchev bestowed Crimea on the Soviet Republic of Ukraine.

The hetmanate quickly fell apart in what Ukrainian historians call '*the ruin*', with the west Bank of the Dnieper reverting to the Poles while the east bank, still notionally under Cossack control, went to Russia as shown in the first map I showed you. The Russian territory now included Kiev and, in 1686, the Patriarch of Constantinople passed the metropolitanate of Kiev over to the Patriarch of Moscow. This was the settlement which Bartholomew, the current Patriarch of Constantinople, rescinded in 2019, when he recognised the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine, with its own Metropolitan of Kiev, resulting in a breaking of communion between Constantinople and Moscow.<sup>5</sup>

We're now entering into the period of the rule of Peter the Great and no sooner had Constantinople given Kiev to the Patriarch of Moscow than Peter suppresses the patriarchate of Moscow. The last Patriarch of Moscow - prior to 1917 - died in 1700 and Peter prevented the appointment of a new one. In 1721 he set about a radical reorganisation of the administrative structure of the Russian church, and who did he turn to to organise it but the Rector of the Kiev academy, Theophan Prokopovich. The twentieth century Orthodox theologian, George Florovsky in his *The Ways of Russian Theology*, complains that the early eighteenth century saw what he calls a '*ukrainisation*' of the Russian church. But where Moghila

was suspected of having a Catholic caste of mind, Prokopovich, also educated in European universities, had reacted strongly against Catholicism and, according to Florovsky, was not just influenced by Protestantism but should be seen as part of the history of Protestantism. The education of the higher clergy in Russia was now remodelled along the lines of the Kiev Academy. Through Ukraine, Russia was getting a whiff of the Renaissance and the Reformation, indeed of '*classicism*' and the attendant '*humanism*'.

Meanwhile the Russians were taming the Cossacks, essentially by turning Cossack military chiefs into Russian noblemen and landowners and the ordinary, previously free Cossacks into serfs. But on the Polish side of the Dnieper, the opposite was happening. The Polish government officially suppressed the Cossacks in 1700 but large numbers of peasants flowed into this now depopulated land and soon launched on a series of violent popular revolts called '*haidamaki*', culminating in 1768 in the Koliivschvina revolt which took the form partly of a civil war with the Polish nobility, themselves engaged, as the '*Confederation of Bar*', in a revolt against the Polish King; but also a war between Orthodox and Uniate. The Koliivschvina is celebrated in a long epic poem, *Haidamaky*, perhaps Taras Shevchenko's most important work. Nonetheless it contributed mightily to the final collapse of the Polish state and the partitions which, by the end of the eighteenth century brought the whole west bank of the Dnieper under Russian control.

#### MAP 5 Partitions of Poland IN RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA

<sup>5</sup> I discuss this in a short essay - *The Dispute over the Orthodox Church in Ukraine* - <http://www.peterbrooke.org/politics-and-theology/ukraine/>





I'm not sure that I can account for it but it seems to me a quite remarkable fact that after two centuries of almost unimaginable violence while notionally ruled by the Poles this part of the world is relatively pacified throughout most of the nineteenth century. A large part of the explanation is of course Catherine's defeat of the Tatars and incorporation of their territory at more or less the same time as the Polish partitions.

The division of classes in the territories taken from Poland, now known as 'Malorossiya' - 'Little Russia' - still resembles the old order - Polish, therefore Catholic, landowners; Orthodox peasants; Jewish middlemen. This, together with Belarus to the North, and Moldavia to the South West, was still the part of the world with the largest Jewish population and of course towards the end of the century we have the famous 'Russian' - in fact Ukrainian, Belarusian or Moldovan - pogroms but these, terrifying as they were at the time, are still - at least in the nineteenth century - on a small scale compared to what had been happening in the Polish territories in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

What Russia gained in the Polish partitions was the more anarchic, Cossack element of the people destined, in the twentieth century, to live in a distinct Ukrainian state. The more stable population in the West, in Galicia with its capital, Lviv, was taken by Austria and this marks an enormous improvement in their lives, or at least in the lives of the Uniates. For a start they cease to be called 'Uniates', a name which had already become derogatory, indicating an inferior, half-in-half-out sort of Catholic. The Austrian Empress, Maria-Theresa, declared that there should be no distinction drawn between Latin rite and Eastern rite Catholics who were now renamed as 'Greek Catholics'. In Austria, the Greek Catholic Church flourished mightily and became the organising centre for the development of a distinct 'Ruthenian' identity. In the second half of the century, the Church launched a comprehensive programme of educating the peasantry through reading clubs, which then became the means - quite contrary to the Church's intentions - by which National Populist and Socialist intellectuals were able to get access to them.<sup>6</sup>

One thing that emerges clearly from the story so far is the existence of two quite distinct political entities - Galicia, centred on Lviv, which is now part of Austria, and on the other hand what might be called Ukraine proper, the old borderland, centred on Kiev, which is now part of Russia. The distinction existed even when both were notionally part of Poland, with Galicia as a relatively stable entity, Ukraine as a very turbulent entity. Looked at purely from the religious point of view (not the only angle from which it could be looked at) both sides could now be reasonably content. The Greek Catholic Church had a well respected place in Catholic Austria; the Orthodox Ukrainians were now living in an Orthodox country - still the only Orthodox country outside the Ottoman Empire. It's true that the Orthodox still living in Austria were having a harder time and there was a tendency within the Greek Catholic Church which aspired to becoming more like Russian Orthodoxy - the more or less contemporary Anglo-Catholic tendency in the Church of England comes to mind. They were regarded with great suspicion and eventually suppressed. Also, the Greek Catholic Church in Russia was suppressed (or, as the Orthodox would like to put it, restored to Orthodoxy) in 1839. But this concerns more the history of Belarus than of Ukraine.

## 1917 AND ITS AFTERMATH

Everything, though, changed in 1917, when, in conditions of war, a liberal revolution was followed by the Bolshevik

revolution. With the liberal revolution and the abdication of the Tsar a great council was held to reorganise the Russian Orthodox Church and restore the Moscow patriarchate. I say 'restore' but I really regard this as a quite new development. The original Moscow patriarchate was established with the blessing of Constantinople in the sixteenth century but I very much doubt if Peter and Theophan Prokopovich consulted Constantinople when they suppressed it and replaced it with the 'Holy Synod.' Nor have I seen any sign that Constantinople was consulted when the patriarchate was restored. The installation of the first of the new patriarchs, Tikhon, coincided almost to the day with the Bolshevik seizure of power.

In Ukraine, the liberal revolution in February or March (depending on the calendar you use) produced an initial outpouring of patriotic fervour. Kiev was full of crowds waving blue and yellow flags and a 'Ukrainian Central Rada' was formed along the lines of the Provisional Government in St Petersburg. It was made up of parties that supported some form of autonomy for Ukraine but there was little interest in the idea of complete independence until January 1918 when the area was invaded by a Bolshevik army under Mikhail Muraviev, following a desperate appeal from Lenin to requisition grain and other foodstuffs to feed the starving St Petersburg (or Petrograd as it was known at that time, sounding less German): '*For God's sake, take most energetic revolutionary measures to send bread, bread, and bread again! Otherwise Piter [Petrograd] may perish.*' The energetic measures included a prolonged bombardment of Kiev followed by a radical purge of anyone suspected of separatist or monarchist sympathies.<sup>7</sup>

### MAP 6

With the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Ukraine was occupied by the Germans who installed a Cossack general, Pavlo Skoropadsky as 'hetman' but with the defeat of Germany and Austria an independent Ukraine was established under

<sup>7</sup> Serhy Yekelchuk: 'The Ukrainian meanings of 1918 and 1919', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol.36, No.1/2 (2019), pp.73-86.

See overleaf for map of Ukraine in 1918.

Note that Crimea and the Don Cossack areas were held by the 'White', anti-Bolshevik Russian, forces. Also 'Yuzovka', named for its founder, the Welshman John Hughes, is the modern Donetsk. In between Yuzovka and Donetsk it was called Stalino.

<sup>6</sup> See the essay by John-Paul Himka: 'The Greek Catholic Church and Nation-Building in Galicia, 1772-1918', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol.8, No.3/4 (December 1984), pp. 426-452.



the military leadership of long time national separatist Simon Petliura.<sup>8</sup>

There is a controversy as to Petliura's personal responsibility for the massive assault on Jews that accompanied this first Ukrainian's People's Republic (ONU) but no controversy as to the fact of it occurring. The Odessa pogrom which followed the 1905 revolution had been on a much larger scale than anything that had preceded it,<sup>9</sup> and the pogrom that followed the declaration of the ONU was on a much larger scale than the Odessa pogrom.

Our main concern here, however, is with the church and so it's worth mentioning that one of Petliura's first acts in January 1919 was to secure a government decree for the establishment of a Ukrainian Orthodox Church, independent of the newly established Moscow patriarchate. The actual Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church did not come into existence until after the defeat of Petliura and the apparently definitive incorporation of Ukraine into the Soviet Union. At the time, the formation of the UAOC was encouraged by the Soviet government, always on the lookout for opportunities to sow dissent and division within the church.

Unable to attract any canonically ordained bishops, the UAOC created its own episcopate. It was not recognised by any of the other main Orthodox jurisdictions.<sup>10</sup>

But there is no way that at this stage in my talk I can go into the ins and outs of Soviet policy with regard to the church. I have

8 Mikhail Bulgakov's novel *The White Guard* opens with a Russian-orientated family in Kiev at the moment of the departure of the Germans, whom they see as having provided them with some protection against Petliura.

9 See in my Solzhenitsyn series *Solzhenitsyn and the 'Russian Question'*, Part 18 - The Pogroms, part seven - Odessa in 1905, <http://www.peterbrooke.org/politics-and-theology/solzhenitsyn/pogroms-7/>

10 Bohdan B. Bociurkiw: 'Ukrainization Movements within the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol.3/4, (1979-1980), pp. 92-111

on my website an attempt to make some sense of the history of the Moscow patriarchate during this period<sup>11</sup> but I don't go into the very interesting specifics with regard to Ukraine.

I really have to try to wrap this up, even though I suppose I'm reaching the point everyone thinks is the most interesting, the point at which we approach recent events. But there is still some ground to cover. After the defeat of Austria, Ruthenian nationalists in Galicia briefly declared a '*Western Ukrainian Peoples Republic*'. It should be remarked that, according to John-Paul Himka, it was only in the very late nineteenth century that more nationally minded Ruthenians began to call themselves '*Ukrainians*', recognising that it was only in conjunction with the Ukrainians in Russia that a nation-state could be formed.<sup>12</sup> The western republic briefly united with Petliura's republic but they soon split, with the western republic putting their hopes in Petliura's enemy, the White Russian Anton Denikin, while Petliura put his hope in the westerners' enemy, the Poles. In the post-war settlement, Galicia was delivered over to the newly created Poland and in the raw confrontation of nationalisms that followed the Ruthenians developed a hard ideology quite unlike anything that could previously have been expected of them. This period is crucial to understanding present day Ukrainian nationalism.

## GALICIA AND THE SOVIET UNION

Bad as domination by the Poles might have been, in 1939, as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, they were delivered up to the Soviet Union. Those were the circumstances in which Ukrainians, and especially West Ukrainians, welcomed

11 The Moscow Patriarchate and the Bolshevik Revolution, <http://www.peterbrooke.org/politics-and-theology/moscow/>

12 John-Paul Himka: *Socialism in Galicia*, Harvard University Press, 1983, pp.7-8. In an article - 'Ruthenians' - in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* he says that the term 'Ruthenian' derives from the practise of borrowing the names of peoples mentioned in Latin literature, chosen just because of its resemblance to the other possible term which would be (in a variety of different Latin language transliterations) 'Rusyn'.



the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, taking the opportunity for a mass killing of Poles and Jews which, so far as I know, was a new development in Lviv.<sup>13</sup> Radical antisemitism was certainly part of the old Cossack Ukrainian tradition but not, I think, of the Ruthenians under Austrian rule. I assume it was due to the widespread identification of Jews as supporters of the Communists. At any rate whereas in the nineteenth century, despite all that had happened, Ukraine had the largest concentration of Jews, it now has one of the lowest, through massacre and emigration to the United States and Israel.

#### MAP 7

The map shows the Reichskommissariat established in what had been the western part of Russian Ukraine. Galicia was part of the 'General Government' to the west, which covered Poland.

13 Described in some detail in John-Paul Himka: 'The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crowd', Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol.53, No.2/4 (June-Sept.-Dec. 2011), pp. 209-243.

The area to the east 'under German military government', was where the Soviet partisan movement was strongest.

The Nazi occupation saw, in the Reichskommissariat, a revival of the church, which had been heavily persecuted in the 1930s. Churches were restored, church festivals were again celebrated, Sunday was again respected as a holy day. In particular there was a revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church but it was challenged by what was called the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church which still saw itself as part of the much suffering Russian church.<sup>14</sup> With the Soviet restoration, the Autocephalous Church was suppressed, surviving in the Ukrainian emigration. Galicia was now firmly installed as part of the Soviet Union and in 1946, the Greek Catholic Church was suppressed and its buildings handed over to the revived Moscow patriarchate.

14 Karel C. Berkhoff: 'Was There a Religious Revival in Soviet Ukraine under the Nazi Regime?' The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol.78, No.3 (July 2000), pp. 536-567.



REICHSKOMMISSARIAT UKRAINE

At the end of the war, while many Ukrainians from Dnieper-Ukraine who had supported the Nazis, or used the Nazi invasion to oppose the Communists, were returned to the Soviet Union and ended up dead or in the camps, Galicians were able to persuade their American and British captors that they had only been incorporated into the Soviet Union as a result of the illegitimate Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and were therefore not really Soviet citizens. As a result they were able to continue living in the west, in particular in Canada where there was already a substantial Ukrainian emigré population following the Bolshevik takeover in the wake of the First World War. In many ways this Canadian Ukrainian body, militantly anti-Communist and identifying Communism with Russia, could be

seen as the seedbed of the militantly anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalism of the present day.<sup>15</sup>

John-Paul Himka, himself a Canadian Ukrainian, specialist in the history of Galicia and Lviv and especially of the Greek (now 'Ukrainian') Catholic Church, is interesting in this respect. His father in law was the editor of a Ukrainian paper produced

15 Solzhenitsyn, during his period of exile from the USSR, met some of the Ukrainians living in Canada and left his impression of them (generally favourable despite their hostility to everything Russian) in his autobiography, Between two millstones. I give a brief account at <http://www.peterbrooke.org/politics-and-theology/solzhenitsyn/usa/usa-1.html>



during the Nazi occupation, who emigrated to Canada. Himka maintains that: *'In Galicia, the Central European concept of national identity was reconstituted in the 1990s. I observed this as a frequent visitor to Lviv in 1989 and after, but the subject has yet to be researched by scholars ... Although the Soviet regime had been introduced into Galicia by tremendous violence, that violence ended in the 1950s and since then people had benefited from and grown used to the Soviet system.'* He recognises that *'the resurgence of the Central European nationalism had many sources'* but he attaches particular importance to the influence of the diaspora. The impetus did not come from the people of the area, it came from outside.<sup>16</sup>

I think we can see this also in the current controversy concerning the Orthodox Church. When the Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991, following a vote in Ukraine in favour of independence, there was still an assumption that good relations would prevail in the successor 'Commonwealth of Independent States.' The Moscow patriarch (Alexei II) gave a large degree of autonomy to the Metropolitan of Kiev, Philaret. Philaret called a council of the church which resolved on a complete separation from Moscow, with himself as patriarch (there had never previously been a patriarch of Kiev). But my impression is that the priests and hierarchs of the time thought this was what Moscow wanted. When Alexei called another council making clear that autonomy, not autocephaly was the intention the great majority supported him, possibly more out of conservatism, anxiety that other churches might not recognise a church set up in opposition to Moscow, than any real enthusiasm. Essentially they didn't much care one way or the other, it didn't seem important to their role as an Orthodox priesthood.

Philaret then set up his own rival Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Kyiv Patriarchate. This was not recognised by any of the major Orthodox jurisdictions. So neither the UOC-KP nor the UAOC were recognised. It was in 2018 that the Ukrainian President, Petro Poroshenko, for essentially political reasons, asked the Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew I, to bless a Ukrainian church independent of Moscow. Bartholomew had his own quarrels with the Patriarch of Moscow, Kirill, who had refused to attend the Great Council in Crete in 2016, an attempt by Constantinople to create a more unified Orthodox Church, a forum in which the many disputes among the different jurisdictions could be resolved. Bartholomew brought the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the Kyiv patriarchate together in a new Ukrainian Orthodox Church, or (for those willing to let the Moscow church continue to use the title UOC) Orthodox Church of Ukraine with a new metropolitan of Kiev - Philaret assumed the rather unusual title of *'honorary patriarch.'*

In establishing a *'new'* metropolitanate of Kiev, Bartholomew wasn't admitting the existence of two metropolitans of Kiev. He was rescinding his predecessor's gift of the metropolitanate of Kiev to Moscow. The most interesting thing from his point of view was the assertion of his right to do it. In asserting that the metropolitanate of Kiev is still in his gift he is implicitly asserting that the patriarchate of Moscow is also still in his gift and that the long period in which Moscow acted without reference to Constantinople (in particular since Peter created the Holy Synod in 1721) could be regarded as illegitimate. I don't know if the title *'Patriarch of Kyiv'* will continue in existence after the death of Philaret. Constantinople is geographically quite close to Ukraine and if the patriarchate of Constantinople

<sup>16</sup> John-Paul Himka: 'The Basic identity formations in Ukraine: a typology', Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol.28, No.1/4, 2006, pp.483-500. Highly recommended.

could exercise direct power in Ukraine its position - so terribly weak in Istanbul - would be greatly strengthened.

The quarrel between Constantinople and Moscow is a remarkable development in the history of the Orthodox Church(es) worldwide. Whether it is of much benefit to the pastoral needs of the people of Ukraine is another matter.

How this pans out will eventually depend on the outcome of the current Russian *'special military intervention.'* The long term consequences for the Orthodox Church will probably turn on who is most blamed for the large numbers of Ukrainian soldiers killed in the course of it - the Russians for the invasion and seizure of territory, or the Ukrainian nationalists and their western backers for, over the course of the past twenty years, pushing ordinary Ukrainians into a confrontation which they didn't want and couldn't hope to win except, perhaps, at the cost of fearful sacrifices.

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## ECONOMICS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION Contd. (Part Six)

By Peter Brooke

### EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY AND EUROPEAN PAYMENTS UNION, 1950-58

#### The ECSC

According to the Wikipedia entry on the European Coal and Steel Community:

‘The ECSC was first proposed as the Schuman Declaration by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in 1950 on Victory Day (9th May) as a way to prevent further wars between France and Germany. He declared he aimed to “*make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible*” which was to be achieved by regional integration of which the ECSC was the first step.’

Alan Milward, in his book *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, gives a more down-to-earth explanation (p.395): ‘*The Schuman Plan was invented to safeguard the Monnet Plan.*’

The Monnet Plan had been devised on the assumption that Germany would be de-industrialised and that France would emerge as the leading European industrial nation. But to fulfil this ambition, France would have to become a major producer of steel. And to become a major producer of steel, France would have to get control of the coking coal available in the Ruhr, which was in the British zone of occupied Germany. The alternative - importing coking coal from the US - was expensive. The previous article in this series has shown, again following Milward, that the French Foreign Office, already in 1948, had realised that the US and Britain were determined to restore German sovereignty, including sovereignty over the Ruhr and that to get access to the necessary coal, France would have to come to terms with a sovereign German government. But even as late as 1950, on the very eve of Schuman’s speech, the French government still had hopes in the ‘*International Ruhr Authority*’ as the means of preserving itself against a resurgent Germany.

In the event, the Treaty forming the ECSC was only signed in April 1951 and only came into effect in 1953 - for coal in February and for steel in May.

The impetus towards the ‘*regional integration*’ evoked in the Wikipedia article came almost entirely from the United States. The Americans from the start had imagined Europe as something similar to what we have at the present time with, if not a single currency, national currencies mutually convertible at fixed rates - the ideal conditions for what Kalecki and Halevi call ‘*oligopolies*’ and others would call ‘*multinationals*’ - companies operating on a scale indifferent to national boundaries. US planning during the war envisaged this on a world scale, hence the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, even, in the ambitions of Harry Dexter White, and with him Roosevelt and Morgenthau, encompassing the Soviet Union. But in the aftermath of the war, these ambitions had to be reduced dramatically. Not only did they face the rival ambitions of the Communist world but the convertibility of sterling, which was to open up the British Empire and the

wider sterling area to penetration by the dollar, failed, as did the first attempt to develop a single market in Western Europe through the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation and the European Recovery Programme (‘*Marshall Aid*’). Far from representing a steady advance across countless obstacles to realising a European dream of integration, the period of the European Recovery Programme represented a quite impressive record of European resistance to the American dream of European integration.

In these circumstances the European Coal and Steel Community, which covered only six countries (France, German, Benelux and Italy) and only dealt with coal and steel must have looked quite pathetic, the more so since its short life was very fraught, largely due to the problems encountered by France - particularly in 1954 the defeat in Dien Bien Phu and the beginning of the Algerian War of Independence. In 1956, quoting Halevi: ‘*while preparing the disastrous Suez adventure with Anthony Eden, France’s Prime Minister [the Socialist, Guy Mollet] went so far as to suggest to the British government the creation of a unified Sterling-Franc monetary area*’<sup>1</sup> which, though it came to nothing, hardly indicates a great commitment to the “*Little Europe*” of the ECSC.

The most important aspect of the ECSC was that it did bind West Germany and France together, albeit in an alliance *contre nature*, an alliance whose main purpose from the French point of view was to keep some sort of control over the Germans. It is questionable if Germany really needed it in economic terms. Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Austria and Switzerland, constituted in themselves a rather neat little trading bloc. The governments of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, in exile in London, had already agreed to form between themselves a customs union - ‘*Benelux*’ - as early as 1944. An attempt to bring Benelux and France together in a ‘*little Europe*’ had faltered partly at least because of the Netherlands’ reluctance to support French proposals for dismantling the German steel industry and restricting German trade.<sup>2</sup>

From the German point of view France was probably an encumbrance, Italy much less so. Italy had no great geopolitical ambitions after the loss of its own imperial possessions (in the case of Ethiopia at the hands of the Belgian government in exile, via the Belgian Congo, which was also a main supplier of rubber to the allies, not to mention the uranium used for the atom bomb). Like Germany, Italy was highly reliant on exports

1 Joseph Halevi: *Europe 1957 to 1979: From the Common Market to the European Monetary System*, Institute for New Economic Thinking, Working Paper no 101, June 2019, p.5

2 Richard T.Griffiths and Frances M.B.Lynch: ‘*L’échec de la “Petite Europe” - Le conseil tripartite 1944-1948*’, *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, No.152 (October 1988), pp.39-62.

of manufactured goods and imports of food and raw materials. Unlike Germany it specialised not in high capital value products, the stuff of oligopoly, but more on

‘intermediate capital goods and mechanical consumption goods like home appliances as well as motor vehicles’ (Halevi, 1957 to 1979, p.14).

These were much more vulnerable to competitive pricing than the German specialities but just the sort of thing the German beneficiaries of Erhard’s consumer led policy wanted. In the immediate post war period the Christian Democrat government in Italy, supported by the Communist Party, pursued a policy of austerity, reducing imports through reducing domestic consumption rather than through tariffs, which by 1957 had been lifted on 99% of all imports from Europe. Its large pool of unemployed labour in the South, which kept wages down in the more industrialised North, provided other parts of Europe with a useful source of immigrant labour. Following Halevi (1957 to 1979, p.13):

‘Outmigration to France and Belgium but not yet to Germany, which would be absorbing Italian immigrants from the second half of the 1950s till the late 1960s, began in earnest as soon as those countries were about to near completion of postwar reconstruction.’

Ludwig Erhard saw the ECSC as ‘*a needless restriction on German Industry*’<sup>3</sup> but Adenauer saw that the alliance with France was Germany’s road to political rehabilitation, the removal of the Ruhr authority and the weakening of the Occupation Statute, which was still operative and still being used to dismantle or break up the larger German enterprises – something of which Erhard may well have approved. In fact Germany probably benefited more from the ECSC than France which never realised anything close to Monnet’s original vision of industrialisation and by 1957, on the eve of signing the Treaty of Rome in March, needed a substantial loan from the IMF.

## THE EPU

Which was the more surprising because through the 1950s Europe had a means of dealing with balance of payments problems independent of the IMF. This was the European Payments Union and, unlike the Coal and Steel Community it had been set up under the auspices of the OEEC and covered all the countries of Western Europe – excepting Spain but including Portugal, Iceland, and Turkey. According to Halevi it was devised by two American economists he admires – Robert Triffin and Charles Kindleberger – but it was far removed from the original American vision. Halevi calls it ‘*an institution that operated as close as one could imagine to Keynes’s idea of an international clearing union that the US Government rejected at Bretton Woods.*’ Milward gives a rough description of how it worked:

‘The EPU was a multilateral mechanism, replacing the network of bilateral agreements which had promoted and financed the growth of intra-Western-European foreign trade since 1945. National currencies had to be made freely transferable between central banks up to the limits set out in the agreement for the settlement of current account deficits and surpluses. The settlements were made not directly between central banks themselves, but through the medium of a multilateral clearing house, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) in Basle. The limits within which currency transfers had to be automatically made in settlement were expressed by initial currency quotas

3 Milward p.413

allotted to each member-state on the basis of the estimated value of its foreign trade. These, together with \$350 million allotted from Marshall Aid, made up the working capital of the EPU. Deficits were settled monthly by multilateral compensations between the various debts and surpluses, carried out by the BIS in terms of the EPU’s own unit of account, the *écu*, equivalent in value to the American dollar.

‘The terms on which overall net deficits had to be settled were far more generous than under earlier international multilateral payments systems such as the gold exchange standard of the 1920s. An initial tranche of 20 per cent of each country’s original quota had to be provided as credit to potential trade debtors. After that initial tranche debtors paid on a sliding scale in which the proportion of gold or dollars that they were required to pay in settlement of their debt increased and the proportion of their national currency decreased with each successive tranche of the quota. When the debt was between 20 and 40 per cent of the original quota it was necessary to make 20 per cent of the settlement in gold/dollars. When the debt reached more than 80 per cent of the original quota it was necessary to settle up to 80 per cent in gold or dollars, and only once the quotas were exhausted did settlements have to be made entirely in hard currency.

‘Although the aim of these rules was to provide a progressive disincentive to run trade deficits, the volume of credit which they allowed was still much greater than that which the IMF could make available to its members. Furthermore it was a negotiating machinery. The Management Board of EPU reported to the Executive Committee of OEEC and it was supposed to follow the same cooperative methods. With agreement, a debtor could increase its import barriers without question of retaliation ...’<sup>4</sup>

I gave a rough account of the Keynes proposal in an earlier essay in this series<sup>5</sup> – also pointing to the similarity with the European New Order announced in July 1940 by Walther Funk.<sup>6</sup> All three have in common that national governments retain sovereign control of their currency; that, to quote a near contemporary account by Graham Rees, Professor of Economics in the University College of Swansea: ‘*by means of offsetting bilateral surpluses against bilateral deficits, this currency clearing house submerged bilateral balance of payments positions in the anonymity of a set balance of payments position of each country with the group as a whole*’;<sup>7</sup> and that there was an accepted common currency – Funk’s Reichsmark, Keynes’s ‘*bancor*’ (a currency independent of the interests of any particular state), the EPU’s ‘*écu*’ with a back-up in the gold based dollar. The great advantage of the system was that it allowed the different countries freedom to pursue a wide variety of interventionist policies and restriction of international trade, including against the US. According to Milward (European Rescue, p.356) ‘*discriminatory trade controls over OEEC as a whole were applied against 40 per cent of manufactured exports from North America.*’

4 Alan S.Milward: The European Rescue of the Nation-State, London, Routledge, 1992, pp.348-9.

5 Peter Brooke: ‘The road to Bretton Woods (Part Two): Fighting for Britain against the US’, Irish Foreign Affairs, Vol 14, no 2, June 2021, also on my website at <http://www.peterbrooke.org/politics-and-theology/eu-economics/part-three/>

6 Funks speech, which impressed Keynes, can be consulted at [http://www4.dr-rath-foundation.org/brussels\\_eu/roots/06\\_economic\\_reorganization\\_europe.html](http://www4.dr-rath-foundation.org/brussels_eu/roots/06_economic_reorganization_europe.html).

7 Graham Rees: ‘The Anatomy of successful cooperation: the example of the European Payments Union’, Il Politico, Vol.25, No.3 (September 1960), p.651.



## ADVANTAGES OF WAR (perhaps)

So far removed was all this from what the US wanted - the rationale presented to the US Congress and people, based on the creation of a United States of Europe along the model of the USA - that it may well have jeopardised US financial support to Europe. What may have saved it was the Korean War, or at least the fear of Communism which it intensified.

In the last article in this series I supported Werner Abelshauser's thesis that the rapid restoration of Germany's industrial and economic power was due not so much to the liberalisation policies promoted by Ludwig Erhard as to the fact that Germany had retained much of the industrial infrastructure created under the Nazis, especially during the war, together with a tradition of corporate enterprise that stretched back at least as far as the unification of Germany in the late nineteenth century. This potential for the development of high capital value products was unleashed by the emergence of a usable currency, something that had long been planned by the British and American occupiers and only held back by the need to seek, or to appear to seek, agreement with the Soviet side.

Erhard, however, was responsible for the administration of the reform and the way in which he went about it encouraged not so much development of Germany's productive capacity as a consumer boom. This, together with the need German industry had for raw materials to start up industrial production again, produced a demand for imports which rapidly put Germany into a balance of payments deficit that posed a radical problem for the EPU right at the moment of its inception. Quoting an account by Peter Temin (Emeritus Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a student, as it happens of Charles Kindleberger):

'The EPU had set quotas for the member countries based on their 1949 intra-European trade. West Germany's trade had not revived as quickly as that of other countries, and it received a low EPU quota. As a result, West Germany would have to pay an increasing share of its deficit in gold, reaching 100 per cent before the end of 1950. The country did not have the foreign exchange reserves needed to effect this transaction. The resulting problem emerged at the EPU managing board's first meeting in October 1950 ...

'The Americans, in particular, were not charitable. As in 1931, the Germans were suspected of using the international monetary system for their own nationalistic aims. Happily, these negative views did not prevail. The EPU called in the expert team of Cairncross and Jacobsson who argued that the West German trade imbalance was only temporary. The EPU extended a \$120 million credit to West Germany with macroeconomic conditions. As requested, the West Germans tightened credit in late 1950 and early 1951. Erhard also suspended some of his trade liberalization, formalizing the change in February. A trade balance surplus appeared in March 1951.'<sup>8</sup>

Temin is arguing against a view argued by Abelshauser that the war, which started in June 1950, prompted a surge in demand for the high-capital intensified goods Germany was good at, thus prompting a 'Koreaboom'. Temin says (p.738) that

'neither American imports nor German exports rose unusually at that time. Instead Germany suffered an adverse price shock at the same time as its imports increased. The result was not

8 Peter Temin: 'The 'Koreaboom' in West Germany: Fact or Fiction?', *The Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Nov., 1995), p.750.

a boom but a balance of payments crisis. The fledgling EPU acted swiftly to keep this small problem from escalating into a major economic or political crisis.'

Mark Spicka's book, *Selling the Economic Miracle*, which I quoted in the previous article and which is mainly concerned with the public relations policies of the CDU/CSU government, broadly accepts Abelshauser's view and gives some figures which seem to support it:

'New orders for goods to support the war effort streamed into the country. The industrial production index shot up from 100 in the fourth quarter of 1949 (1936=100) to 134 in the final quarter of 1950. This trend continued with production reaching 146 by the end of 1951 and 158 by the end of 1952.'<sup>9</sup>

He gives Abelshauser as his source. Halevi agrees:

'The first five years following the defeat of Japan corroborate the view that recovery may peter out. This happened around 1948-49 after the drastic anti-inflationary budgetary policies applied by Joseph Dodge. The reconstruction led recovery stalled and the economy headed towards something more severe than a recession until the arrival of the 'gifts from the Gods' as Japanese economic historians are fond to call the Korean War. In Europe too recovery could have faltered. In Italy where, as pointed out by Augusto Graziani, the 1947 deflationary stabilization had been particularly harsh, the economy stagnated till the end of 1949. The Korean War proved once more to be the factor that prevented the slide into a recession. The early postwar German case is also a good indication that there was no substitute for the creation of effective demand on a large Continental scale. The Bundesrepublik's recovery would have likely come to a halt without the income transfer from the United States, without Cold War rearmament, and, specifically, had the Korean War - an unforeseen event from the European standpoint - not acted as a major impulse to demand for Germany's capital goods.'<sup>10</sup>

Nonetheless Spicka, Temin and Halevi are agreed that the combination of an increased consumer demand for imports and the need for imports to support the restoration of industrial production at a time when, because of pressure from the war, prices were rising posed problems for the German economy. And Temin concludes (p.752):

'Even though the fighting itself was far away, American attitudes towards a possible war in Europe changed dramatically. Instead of thinking about reducing military expenditures after the last European war, the Americans urged everyone to consider increasing them in anticipation of the next war. The Americans put their money where their mouth was and supplied scarce dollars to promote an expansion of military spending.'

Hence Charles Kindleberger's remark, quoted by Halevi (Europe since 1945, p.5) that

"the recovery program, never came to an end but was swallowed up in defense activity which developed under the

9 Mark E. Spicka: *Selling the Economic Miracle - Economic reconstruction and politics in West Germany, 1949-1957*, New York and Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2007 (the full text is available free of charge at <https://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/SpickaSelling>), pp.97-8.

10 Joseph Halevi: *The Political economy of Europe since 1945 - a Kaleckian perspective*, Institute for New Economic Thinkinf, Working paper No. 100. June 2019, p.9.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) following the North Korean attack on South Korea.”

The EPU was supposed come to an end - together with Marshall Aid - in 1952. It was the US State Department that wanted to keep it in existence, seeing it as a vehicle for advancing European integration. This was probably where US anxiety about the war with Communism proved to be advantageous. Although Britain was a major debtor in the system the Conservative government was hostile to it and was trying, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Americans that sterling was ready to become convertible with, and therefore as good as, the dollar. Ludwig Erhard in Germany too was pressing for convertibility of the Deutschmark and a removal of all exchange controls. It is here that we can see a contrast between the neoliberal ideal proclaimed by Erhard and the actual strength of the economy which lay with the much maligned cartels. Quoting Milward again (European rescue, p.370):

‘In a country where even the central bank perceived the currency as primarily an instrument of commerce it was unthinkable that the opinions of industrial exporters could be ignored. When consulted, the industrial association, Deutscher Industrie und Handelstag was even more insistent than the BDL [Bank Deutscher Länder] that any division between convertible and inconvertible currencies within EPU was a threat to German exports. This was to be a consistent position of German industrialists. Their collective organisation the Bundesverband der deutsche Industrie made the same argument two years later [in 1955]. Anything, they argued, which broke up the EPU would hold back the rapidly growing exports to EPU members who would no longer be able to pay for them with the same ease. What Erhard railed against as unrequited exports because they were paid for only by EPU credits, were the capital goods which brought high profits on which further investment depended and whose production had beneficial multiplier effects on the German economy.’

Given the apparent success of the EPU the question arises why did it come to an end? A clearing union supported by seventeen different countries seems almost too good to be true. It was of course dependent on American support and was very far removed from American ambitions, which still aimed for complete currency convertibility and the abolition of tariffs. It was accompanied by a process of trade liberalisation agreed by the OEEC. Graham Rees (*European Payments Union*, p.650) praises it as the means of establishing

‘the financial conditions necessary for the breakdown of the trade restrictions and discrimination enshrined in the network of bilateral agreements which characterised European trade during the period of currency inconvertibility, low reserves, unreal exchange rates, inadequate production and inflationary pressures.’

He concludes (p.655) that

‘by this date [1958] the near convertibility of some members currencies and the increased degree of transferability of others, together with agreements concluded by most members with non-member countries for the transferability of currencies, combined to make the E.P.U. an unjustifiable survival from the years of dollar shortage.’

The accounts I have seen of the last days of the EPU mainly concern politicking between Britain and the countries that were to form the EEC but it would be interesting to know what, say,

Portugal, Ireland or Turkey thought of it. The US was thinking in terms of the wider possibilities of the 37 member General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, formed in 1947 in the general world-wide perspective of the Bretton Woods arrangements. Britain was hoping in vain that sterling could join the dollar as an international reserve currency. France, which had pushed for the ECSC as a means of getting access to German coking coal, was worried about the advancing prospect of the EEC which would expose them to the full force of the revived Germany’s capacity for exports. That was one reason why Guy Mollet initially welcomed the British proposal in 1956 for a free trade area that would cover the whole area of the OECC. It was when it became clear that Britain, in order to preserve the preferential arrangements it had with the Empire, wanted to exclude agriculture from its FTA, that France, embroiled in the Algerian war and experiencing severe balance of payments difficulties that went beyond what could be handled by the EPU, agreed to the Treaty of Rome, which De Gaulle in opposition regarded with scorn.<sup>11</sup> Nonetheless, the FTA project was going ahead under the auspices of the OECC through a committee chaired by Reginald Maudling.

De Gaulle came to power in June 1958. Initially Adenauer refused to meet him owing to his reputation as a fierce nationalist and opponent of the EEC. But in Frances Lynch’s account (p.123):

‘The meeting with Adenauer which finally took place at Colombey-les-deux-Églises on 14 September 1958 proved to be a meeting of minds. In wide-ranging talks which covered the globe both men agreed that France and West Germany would have to co-operate closely with each other in order to make Europe independent of the United States. De Gaulle, insisting that Europe would have to be larger than the six Common Market countries, failed, however, to draw Adenauer out on the subject of the FTA. All that Adenauer would say was that Britain, whom he likened to “a rich man who had lost his fortune without yet knowing it,” was not, he believed, trying to attack the Common Market in proposing the free trade area. De Gaulle, who was not as convinced that Britain’s intentions were so honourable, now needed to find some means of exposing Britain’s underlying strategy, but without isolating France from its Common Market partners in the process.’

Lynch (p.127) outlines the French suspicions as to Britain’s underlying strategy:

‘As far as the Quai d’Orsay was concerned, British objectives had become perfectly clear. The British government wanted to undermine the Treaty of Rome, but not to replace it with a larger Europe of seventeen but with the one-world system. To achieve this objective the British government had pursued a complicated strategy with, in some cases, the full support of the United States. Considering the IMF and GATT to be superior to any other treaty, aware of the divisions among the Six, and with a confidence based on the improvement of the British foreign exchange position and by the decisions taken in New Delhi to restore the convertibility of sterling and the deutschmark, the British government was trying to weaken those elements in the Treaty of Rome which had made it possible for France to open its borders. These were first and foremost the preferential aspect of the common agricultural policy which the British

11 I am basing this account largely on Frances B.Lynch: ‘De Gaulle’s first veto: France, the Rueff Plan and the Free Trade Area’, *Contemporary European History*, Vol.9, No 1 (March 2000), pp.111-135.

government was trying to get GATT to condemn; the right of West Germany to retain quantitative restrictions despite the strength of the West German balance of payments; the terms of association of the overseas territories with the EEC on the grounds that they discriminated against the interests of underdeveloped countries; and the common external tariff.'

Basically, then, De Gaulle had been opposed to the EEC on the grounds that it involved a liberalisation of its trade policy in accordance with the demands of the OEEC - convertibility of the franc, and an end to discriminatory quotas imposed on certain imports, which would '*result in grave distress for smaller French industries and even produce a number of bankruptcies*' (Lynch, p.133). But he had come to accept the EEC as a means of securing at least the protections that Mollet had negotiated in the Treaty of Rome and West German support in opposition to the more dangerous FTA demanded by the British and behind that the possibility that the FTA would simply be folded into the wider system of GATT. To sustain this acceptance however, De Gaulle had to accept the austerity package proposed by the fiscal conservative, Jacques Rueff, a man who defined himself as the '*anti-keynes*' and whose views on sound money and a non-interventionist economic policy were very close to those of the German ordo-liberals. We met him briefly in an earlier article in this series.<sup>12</sup>

Lynch concludes:

'De Gaulle, who had been no supporter of the EEC, saw the issue as a power struggle between France and Britain over who should control the economic development of Europe, and thereby of France. At the heart of the struggle was the need to win the support of the Federal Republic of Germany. Although Adenauer shared de Gaulle's distrust of the United States he did not extend this to the United Kingdom. His basic sympathy for Britain, together with Ludwig Erhard's positive endorsement of the FTA, was to force de Gaulle to try to turn the EEC into a Franco-West German alliance in order to defeat the FTA. But not even the promise of French troops to defend Berlin against a Soviet attack, nor de Gaulle's full commitment not to employ safeguard clauses and to honour the trade liberalisation provisions of the Treaty of Rome on 1 January 1959, were enough. The West Germans would only accept the economic division of Europe provided that it was not also a monetary division ... Had de Gaulle not agreed to restore the convertibility of the franc and honour France's obligations to both the OEEC and the EEC on 1 January 1959 the consensus among the Six would have evaporated. The Rueff plan had become a political necessity.'

Not a lot to do with Schuman's professed aim of achieving regional integration as a way to prevent further wars between France and Germany.

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12 Peter Brooke: 'The Road to Bretton Woods: Britain goes off the Gold Standard (Part One)', Irish Foreign Affairs, Vol.14, No.1, March 2021, p.25. Also accessible at <http://www.peterbrooke.org/politics-and-theology/eu-economics/part-two/>

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**By Pat Walsh**

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The Great Calamity that engulfed the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire in 1915 has been narrowed down to a single question: Was the Young Turk Government in Istanbul guilty of Genocide? But the tragedy of the deaths of great numbers of Armenians, Turks and Kurds is inexplicable if confined solely to this. And it obscures important historical questions around the issues of instigation and betrayal that should be raised around these events.

So a context is required to explain what really happened to produce such a disaster. That context is the Great War and the Armenian Insurrection. The Armenian Insurrection is described by a leading figure in it, the Dashnak revolutionary Dr. Pasdermadjian (Armen Garo), in writings long since forgotten.

These put a very different complexion on the events of 1915. They describe a great moment of decision when the very existence of a people was gambled in the struggle for a Great Armenia, carved out of Ottoman territories in which the Armenians constituted a small minority. His two pamphlets reprinted here reveal that the 1914 Ottoman offer of an autonomous Armenian State was rejected by Armenians when what they thought was a better offer came from America, Britain and France. The price was that they fight the Ottomans.

They gambled and lost, bringing disaster on the Armenian people. Also included is a commentary by Pat Walsh on the origin and development of 'the Armenian Question' and its culmination and final resolution in the catastrophic events in Anatolia brought about by the Great War. This reveals the instrumental part played by the Liberal Anglosphere in foisting dangerous notions of historic destiny on the Armenians and then a fraudulent war that encouraged them to destruction.

When remembering the Armenian Great Calamity what should be sought is not only the truth, but the whole truth.

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# On Paul Rohrbach and the Origin of the Ottoman Armenian Relocations of 1915

By Pat Walsh

What is the origin of the Ottoman relocations of the Armenians of Eastern Anatolia, which campaigners describe as the centrepiece of the “*Armenian Genocide*”?

In recent years there has been much focus on the German connection, for obvious reasons. Successfully associating an historical event with Hitler and the Nazis is the ultimate objective of those who wish to damn an enemy.

From the time when the Ottomans were forced into the Great War of 1914 there were attempts at associating them with Germany. A popular theme of the peace loving English Liberals, in their quest to salve their guilty consciences at having to become ferocious war mongers, was that it was a war of “*civilisation against the barbarian*” in which the German barbarians of the west, which the Romans had failed to civilise, had been joined by the Turkish barbarians of the east, who had always been massacring and ravishing poor Christians. It was the stuff that the propagandists of Wellington House took up and Armenian revolutionaries responded to by constructing their narratives around what was required to incite hatred against the Turk in the West.

## Guilty Germans and academics

However, there has been a recent revival of this theme, now conducted largely by Anglophile German academics. Whatever the reason the German academics have combined with the Armenian lobby in just the same way as the British propagandists did a century ago, to do down the Turk in the common interests of humanity. They are fighting the good fight at last, in the ranks of the progressive forces, having learned their lesson and abandoned the *sonderweg*.

But we have to give credit to this recent movement, no matter how ill-informed and misplaced it is, for drawing attention to one of the most substantial links in the German/ Armenian/ Ottoman connection – Paul Rohrbach. This is because Herr Rohrbach unlocks the origin of the Armenian relocations and much of the inspiration for this event, which was unprecedented in Ottoman history and which therefore deserves full investigation.

There is a historical problem for anyone attempting to associate the actions of the Ottoman government, in suddenly attempting to relocate the entire Armenian population of Eastern Anatolia, with previous Ottoman/Armenian relations. 1915 is such an extraordinary event, without precedence, and conducted in the most extraordinary of circumstances of world war that establishing continuity is deeply problematic for anyone with a regard for historical method. Some do attempt this by putting 1915 as the culmination of Ottoman oppression of the Armenians, as a kind of “*Final Solution*” to the “*Armenian Question*” that had existed at least since the 1890s. But that is something which cannot be plausibly argued outside the confines of Armenian propaganda. After all, without 1915, whatever happened in the 1890s involving the Armenian revolutionary groups attempting to secure Western military intervention by armed risings, in order to replicate the “*Bulgarian Horrors*”, would only be a footnote in history.

So a different argument has been advanced for 1915.

This focusses on recognition that the Ottoman Empire did indeed change with its new Young Turk leadership at the helm.

European notions of nationalism were employed in a nation building process in which non-Turks, Armenians and Greeks, were the victims as the modern state of Turkey emerged. The German connection assisted this process in modernising the archaic Ottoman structures, providing greater organisation and the ability to transform the state in a way that was impossible for the Sultanate.

Now, that is certainly an improvement in explanation about what happened, over the crudities of the Armenian narrative, but it is also problematic on a number of counts. It begs the question of whether the importation of nationalism into the region by the Imperial Powers was the thing that did for the Armenians and that is a dangerous notion indeed, if full responsibility needs to be laid at the door of the Turks.

So, the way out of this problem is to accuse one Imperial Power, namely Germany, of full responsibility for inspiring the Turks to the depths of depravity, and to portray Imperial Germany as a proto-Nazi state in the making.

## Who was Paul Rohrbach?

Paul Rohrbach is central to all this, so it is worth describing who he actually was. Rohrbach was a highly educated Baltic German Lutheran Minister, born in 1869. In 1903 he became head of the Settlement Commission in the German Imperial adventure in South West Africa where he attempted to settle 2 million German colonists. He participated actively in operations against the Herero people (which has recently been termed “*the first genocide of the 20th Century*”).

Rohrbach joined the German counter-insurgency campaign that would kill tens of thousands of natives. Rohrbach volunteered and participated in several patrols of the Schutztruppe. By his own admission, these were often arbitrary killing sprees, targeting natives with little concern whether they were insurgents or not. General Lothar von Trotha was ordered to drive the Herero deep into the Kalahari and then to cordon off the desert. Tens of thousands of Herero died of thirst or exposure in the desert. The surviving Herero and Nama people, were interned in concentration camps, modelled on the British ones used against the Boers. In these camps, as in South Africa, malnutrition, hard labour, disease and exposure killed thousands more. It is estimated that by the end of the operation, some 60,000 Herero and 10,000 Nama had perished.

After returning to Berlin in 1906, Rohrbach worked with the Foreign Office and Imperial Colonial Office. He accepted a lectureship in colonial economy at the Handelshochschule Berlin and wrote prolifically to encourage and popularise German colonialism, which was very much a minority interest in the country.

According to his English translator Rohrbach was the most widely read German on politics and economics in 1912 with his *Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (The German Idea in the World) selling 150,000 copies. His popular writings were said to have inspired more Germans than any other since the formation of the German State in 1871. His other book that was translated into English was *Der Krieg und die Deutsche Politik* (The War

and German Policy but translated as *Germany's Isolation: An exposition of the Economic Causes of the War*) which was written just before the Great War but published as it started.

Rohrbach was an Anglophile German Liberal Imperialist. That is to say he admired the British Empire and England's "civilising mission" in the world and wanted Germany to follow in her footsteps. Rohrbach was one of those Germans who came to believe that Bismarck's German Empire, which was an empire of Germans rather than of subject races, could not continue to stand aloof from the general Imperialism of Europe and survive.

As Rohrbach noted:

"Bismarck kept Germany's world policies within the limits which... were prescribed by her continental policies. He placed the continental policy in every detail above the world policy, and granted to the first no more than the interest of the second permitted." (*Germany's Isolation: An exposition of the Economic Causes of the War*, p.112)

Rohrbach believed that Bismarck's wise policy was no longer adequate to its situation because German economic growth had made a world policy essential to break free of its continental isolation, among the globalised Powers of Imperialist capitalism.

In this era it became apparent to Rohrbach and other Germans that a traditional mode of life was impossible, so a course of development was entered upon with such success that Germany became a competitor to Britain. Would Britain allow an increasingly successful rival to flourish indefinitely in a world market which was its creation, and which it policed through its Royal Navy? Rohrbach thought not. He concluded that in order to survive in the world Britain made, Germany had to shape up to defend its developing interests. A naval force that was as powerful as its army had to be built so that others (particularly Britain) would be deterred from attacking Germany.

For Rohrbach German national expansion was an imperative for viability as a World People. He propagandised the view that Germany, in order to become a normal European state, had to leave aside its isolation and become an Imperialist oppressor and exploiter of "inferior" peoples. He sought, therefore, to develop among Germans a sense of racial superiority pioneered by the English and widely held by that time among other Western Europeans. Rohrbach, impressed by German development, understandably believed that Germany was actually a superior version of Britain, its Anglo-Saxon cousin, and had more to offer the World than England, particularly in culture. He concurred with the British Imperialists that the expansion of the white race was essential to progress in the world and barbaric, primitive peoples, who contributed little to humanity, had the destiny of moving aside, or being exterminated in the process if they stood in the way.

Rohrbach was Anglophile in his African colonialist aspect. But he also promoted another feature of German development that really disturbed Britain. This was the policy aimed at preserving the existing state structure in the Middle East. The German policy was to support existing states and assist in their evolution to make them functional against the destructive influence of European Imperialism. It was this aspect of German foreign policy, and not the petty attempts at colonialism, that really aggravated Britain. The renovation of the Ottoman State,

which Germany began to engage thoroughly in from the turn of the century, came up against Britain's plans to whittle away its territory. This was a serious matter and it ultimately led to World War.

## Rohrbach and the Ottoman Armenians

Rohrbach was a great and long-standing admirer of the Armenian element of the Ottoman Empire. His interest in them continued over a period of 40 years. Rohrbach wrote two books about them: *'In Turan und Armenien auf den Pfaden russischer Weltpolitik'* (1898), and *'Armenien: Beiträge zur armenischen Landes-und Volkskunde'* (1919). He saw them as an indispensable part of Ottoman life and the economy of the state. Like other elements of the Ottoman state he was intent on preserving them. His main worry was that those Armenians in the Southern Caucasus might act against the Ottoman state encouraging the Ottoman Armenians into becoming a subversive element in the interests of Russian expansion.

In 1914 Rohrbach founded the German-Armenian Society (*Deutsch-Armenische Gesellschaft*) with Johannes Lepsius, a fellow Protestant missionary, and its first Chairman. Rohrbach became Lepsius's deputy in the German-Armenian Society. Lepsius has become one of the great heroes of Armenia for his work in Germany on behalf of the Armenians during the War. His book, *"Report on the situation of the Armenian people in Turkey"*, was distributed throughout Germany in 1915/16 before censorship was enforced upon it. Both Lepsius and Rohrbach are regularly cited by Armenians to this day as supporters and great allies of the Armenian cause.

In 1924, the United States challenged the citizenship of Tatos Cartozian, an Oregon carpet dealer who had gained US citizenship in 1923, seventeen years after his emigration from Armenia. The prosecuting attorney, argued that Armenians could not be considered part of the White Race and entitled to US Citizenship. The defence provided scientific evidence by Race Scientists and the German, Paul Rohrbach's personal testimony was marshalled in support of Cartozian's case. In the end, the judge agreed with the defence that Armenians were part of the White Master Race, and not inferior breeds like Red Indians, Yellow Asians or Black Negroes.

The United States' Racial Order was the main inspiration for the Nazi regime in the 1930s. Rohrbach fought the racial battle for the Armenians in Nazi Germany. The Armenian publication, *'Dro' Drastamat Kanayan: Armenia's First Defence Minister of the Modern Era'* by Antranig Chalabian reveals that Dr Paul Rohrbach and Artashes Abeghian published a book in 1934 called *'Armenian-Aryan'* in collaboration with a number of Nazi intellectuals which "strove to prove that Armenians belong to the Aryan race and the Armenian language to the Indo-European family of languages." (p.234) The year before, in 1933, "Goebbels had formally declared that the Armenians were Aryan." (p.248). These decisions provided the ideological cover for General Dro and other Dashnak leaders, along with the large Armenian Legion, to fight alongside the Nazis on the Eastern Front and put their experience in depopulating Azerbaijani settlements to good effect against the Jews and other non-Aryans.

This is Paul Rohrbach, the good German, for the Armenians.

However, this is where things become strange, because some Armenian writers had noticed another aspect to Paul Rohrbach, which is not so appealing. This is the rather inconvenient fact that he may well have been the originator of the idea for relocating the Armenians to Syria and Iraq. There are, as a consequence, two Paul Rohrbachs in the Armenian narrative – Rohrbach the

great friend of Armenians and exposé of the “*Genocide*” and Rohrbach the inspiration for the Ottoman relocation of the Armenians, the main event of the “*Genocide*”. How could this be? How could these two Paul Rohrbachs exist side by side?

The explanation lies in the partial nature of the Armenian narrative, which is basically a propagandist/social science construct. To understand Rohrbach one has to be a historian and attempt to actually understand events rather than just marshalling them as disconnected assertions for a cause.

## Rohrbach – Inspirer of the Armenian Relocations

Vakahn Dadrian in his ‘*History of the Armenian Genocide*’ reveals the other Paul Rohrbach. Dadrian calls Rohrbach the

“theoretician who implanted in the Turkish minds the idea of the expediency of the evacuation of the Armenians from their ancestral territories in eastern Turkey and their relocation in Mesopotamia for the purposes of populating and cultivating the areas through which the Baghdad Railway system was to be established.” (p.254)

Dadrian then notes the evidence for Rohrbach, friend of Armenia, being the inspirer of the relocations/“*Genocide*”. He cites the French writer, René Pirion (*La Suppression des Arméniens Méthode Allemande-Travail Turc*, 1916, pp.12-13) who claimed that Rohrbach advanced this proposal as a solution to the Ottoman’s Armenian problem, which had been made acute by the Dashnak/Hunchak risings of the 1890s. He did so both for German and Ottoman interests. But more of that later.

Ambassador Morgenthau, another pillar of the “*Genocide*” narrative, made the same claim:

“Certain German writers have even advocated the application of this policy to the Armenians. According to the Paris *Temps*, Paul Rohrbach “in a conference held at Berlin, some time ago, recommended that Armenia should be evacuated of the Armenians. They should be dispersed in the direction of Mesopotamia and their places should be taken by Turks, in such a fashion that Armenia should be freed of all Russian influence and that Mesopotamia might be provided with farmers which it now lacked.” The purpose of all this was evident enough. Germany was building the Bagdad railroad across the Mesopotamian desert. This was an essential detail in the achievement of the great new German Empire, extending from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. But this railroad could never succeed unless there should develop a thrifty and industrious population to feed it. The lazy Turk would never become such a colonist. But the Armenian was made of just the kind of stuff which this enterprise needed. It was entirely in accordance with the German conception of statesmanship to seize these people in the lands where they had lived for ages and transport them violently to this dreary, hot desert. The mere fact that they had always lived in a temperate climate would furnish no impediment in Pan-German eyes. I found that Germany had been sowing those ideas broadcast for several years; I even found that German savants had been lecturing on this subject in the East. “I remember attending a lecture by a well-known German professor,” an Armenian tells me. “His main point was that throughout their history the Turks had made a great mistake in being too merciful toward the non-Turkish population. The only way to insure the prosperity of the empire, according to this speaker, was to act without any sentimentality toward all

the subject nationalities and races in Turkey who did not fall in with the plans of the Turks.” (*Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story*, Chapter XXVII, p. 367)

It has been put forward that Rohrbach made the suggestion that the Ottomans relocate the Armenians in a lecture to the German Geographic Society – a Berlin institution which aped the original British Empire version, in which geographers from august academic institutions in Britain served the cause of Imperial expansion. The relocation proposal was termed the “*Rohrbach Plan*” according to one senior Armenian cleric (Zaren Archbishop, ‘*My Patriarchal Memoirs, Documents and Testimonies*’, 1947, p.104).

Arnold Toynbee, the famous English historian and Wellington House war propagandist, wrote in ‘*Turkey: A Past and A Future*’ in *The Armenian Herald* p.198:

“A month or two before the outbreak of war Dr. Rohrbach stated, in a public lecture, that “Germany has an important interest in effecting and maintaining contact with the Armenian nation. We have set before ourselves the necessary and legitimate aim of spreading and enrooting German influence in Turkey, not only by military missions and the construction of railways, but also by the establishment of intellectual relations, by the work of German Kultur—in a word, by moral conquests; and we are determined, by pacific means, to reach an amicable understanding with the Turks and the other nations in the Turkish Empire. Our ulterior object in this is to strengthen the Turkish Empire internally with the aid of German science, education, and training, and for this work the Armenians are indispensable.” A few months later Germany, as part price of Turkey’s intervention in the War, had to leave the Young Turks a “free hand” to exterminate the nation which was the indispensable instrument of her Turkish policy.”

General von der Goltz is credited by Dadrian to have taken up Professor Rohrbach’s plan and proposed it at a public lecture, sponsored by the Deutsch-Türkische Vereinigung, in Berlin in February 1914 (AA Türkei 183/39, A28384, Enclosure No.2, August 5 1915). The argument was that since Tsarist Russia was interfering in the internal affairs of the Ottomans under the pretext of protecting Christians, this had led to the Balkan assault on the Ottoman Empire and its drastic shrinkage. The same model of Tsarist/Christian advance which drove Muslims in their millions out of the Balkans during 1912-13 was now being applied in Eastern Anatolia. In order to spare the Ottomans a similar disaster in 1914-15 the roughly half million Armenians of Eastern Anatolia who inhabited the provinces of Van, Bitlis and Erzurum, which the Tsar coveted, should be resettled in areas around Aleppo and Mesopotamia, where they could no longer serve as an instrument or fifth column for Russian expansion (Dadrian, p.255).

Dadrian then makes the case for the Germans pressurising the reluctant Ottomans into the relocation operation as a necessity of the military situation in 1915. He notes Talaat Pasha’s interview with Aubrey Herbert in which the Ottoman leader confirmed that it was the Germans who pressed for anti-Armenian measures. Said Halim, the Grand Vizier, also suggested that the relocations came about after “*months of pressure from the military authorities*” who were German (p.257). He includes more evidence to back up his argument.

In essence, then, Dadrian argues that the Germans pushed the reluctant Ottomans toward seeing the Armenians as a mortal threat and relocating them.

It should also be noted that the Armenian’s great hero, Johannes Lepsius, was another believer in the relocation of the



Armenians. Lepsius stressed to the German Foreign Office that the Armenians were extremely militarily important. That is all in his papers. Lepsius argued that the Russian Armenians could be potentially rallied to the side of Germany and Austria, and that if they weren't rallied, and instead became allies of Russia, they would actually be very dangerous to the Germans and the Ottoman Turks in the war. That is, of course, the very thing the Turkish government attempted at the Dashnaks Conference at Erzurum in August 1914.

In late May 1915, Lepsius made contact with the German Foreign Office in connection with the Armenian insurrection at Van and offered himself as a mediator between the Turks and Armenians. The Armenians had captured the city of Van and put the Muslim population to the sword, later handing the city over to the advancing Russian invaders. Lepsius tried to impress the German Foreign Office with how important the Armenians could be for Germany. "*One cannot treat a nation of four million as a quantité négligeable*," he said. He described the Armenians as a rope stretching from Turkey to Russia, with one half in Russia and the other in Turkey. But it was the Ottoman disaster at Van, brought about by the Armenian insurrection, that finally prompted the relocation policy.

## Explaining Rohrbach

There are no modern Armenian or German accounts which can explain the totality of Paul Rohrbach – friend of the Armenian people and advocate of their forced migration by the Ottomans. Why? Because he does not fit the formulaic narrative demanded by the social science "*historians*". But he is explicable within the context of real historical understanding which investigates continuity and cause and effect in history. So let us look at what he wrote just prior to the Great War about the Ottomans and Armenians in the context of Great Power politics. It is immensely interesting and informative.

Rohrbach had a very astute and accurate view of what had taken place in the decade prior to the Great War. In response to Germany's rise as a commercial power, Britain had re-orientated its Balance of Power policy in Europe. Making arrangements and informal alliances with its traditional enemies, France (1904) and Russia (1907), Britain had decided to provoke and join in a future European war against Germany to smash her commercial development. Rohrbach even predicted that it was never Britain's intention to destroy Germany, as the *Germania Delenda Est* people proclaimed, but simply to reduce her to a future pawn in a renewed Balance of Power. That proved a remarkably accurate prediction. The new understanding with the Tsar, in which Russia's military forces were to be used against Germany, necessitated a change in the British policy with regard to the Ottoman Empire. No longer would Britain guarantee the Ottoman integrity against the Tsar's ambitions but collaborate in its destruction. When the Anglophile/Francophile Young Turks came to power in Istanbul they attempted to distance themselves from previous fraternal relations with Germany but found it impossible given the predatory intentions of those they wished to ameliorate relations with. They were driven back into Germany's arms by the mutual need to avoid destruction.

Rohrbach journeyed extensively in the eastern Ottoman provinces from 1898 to 1907 and wrote about his experiences in the *Preussische Jahrbucher* and *Die Hilfe*. He was the most popular enthusiast for the Berlin-Baghdad Railway in Germany. Rohrbach's 1902 book *Die Bagdadbahn*, which contained material from his articles, brought him national recognition in Germany and corresponding notoriety in England. His book

was a realistic assessment of the railway and its economic and strategic prospects. Despite being a colonialist himself he warned against anyone who proposed such a thing in the Ottoman territories. Rohrbach saw the strongest possible Ottoman state in the Middle East as being in Germany's interests and the Bagdadbahn as the major instrument for its defence, regeneration and the future development of the entire region. He noted that Ottoman reinforcements to counter a Russian invasion would take between 6 weeks and 3 months to arrive in eastern Anatolia without improved railway infrastructure.

Germany had annoyed Britain in its economic relations with the Ottoman Empire, which threatened to rejuvenate the "*Sick Man of Europe*" whose territory Britain had finally agreed to carve up with its rivals. The German Berlin-Baghdad Railway was a particular affront to Britain as it trumped a previous proposal from the famous English engineer, Sir William Willcocks, who had proposed a British cross-rail scheme, along with a large plantation of Indians in Mesopotamia, to enhance British hegemony from an extended Indian Empire across Southern Persia, Mesopotamia and Syria to the Mediterranean. The ultimate aim was to sever this belt of land, including the Arabian Peninsula to the south, from the Ottoman Empire, as Egypt had been detached in the previous decades, making it a protectorate of the British Empire.

Rohrbach understood that the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 placed the Ottomans in dire peril, along with developing German interests. The Ottomans' British "*protector*" had been removed and was now prepared to countenance a Russian advance into Anatolia. Rohrbach correctly predicted that whilst Russia was going to be permitted to grab eastern Anatolia ("*Armenia*") and perhaps Constantinople/Istanbul itself, Britain would take Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia itself, leaving France with Northern Syria and Lebanon. All this was remarkably accurate in what subsequently was arranged (before it began falling apart for the Tsarist part of the territorial grab during the test of war).

The Tsar had attempted to move into Eastern Anatolia, taking advantage of Ottoman difficulty during the Balkan wars during 1912-13. Rohrbach related how in 1913 Germany was compelled to warn Russia off from an invasion of Eastern Anatolia on the threat of war, to protect the independence of the Ottoman Empire:

"Exactly twenty-five years after Bismarck had voiced his opposition to the Battenberg marriage, with a view of preventing a clash with Russia in matters pertaining to the Orient, Germany was compelled to interfere, with the full weight of her armed forces, in a question which was destined to lead her infinitely farther into the Orient than her previous policy had kept her from entering it. Early in 1913, Russia threatened to send her troops into Turkish Armenia in order to bring Turkey to terms regarding the demands of the allied Balkans. Geographically as well as topographically Armenia is the key to the Anatolian peninsula and the lowlands of Mesopotamia. In the hands of Russia, that key would have shut out Turkey from the possibility of maintaining her independence. Germany, being greatly interested in the continued independence of the Turkish empire, notified Russia that the peace of Europe was endangered if Russian troops crossed the Armenian frontiers. There could be no doubt as to the meaning of Germany's message. The Russian invasion of Armenia was not carried out, the Turkish catastrophe thus being averted." (*Germany's Isolation*, pp.14-15)

It is clear in the following passage how important Rohrbach considered the areas of eastern Anatolia which the Armenians inhabited, to both Ottoman Turkey and Germany:

“Armenia’s geographical location and physical contours are of such a character that Turkey’s political and military existence is at an end if she loses Armenia, and irretrievably at an end if she loses it to Russia. Armenia gives to its owner an immediate and absolute control of eastern Asia Minor and upper Mesopotamia... All of anterior Asia, from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea and the Aegean Sea, would be like an enormous glacis commanded by Russia’s military power. The unification of Armenia, Transcaucasia, and northern Persia by the hand of Russia are a menace to the entire western Asia, formidable beyond the power of comprehension. If, therefore, the Turkish empire is to be preserved, Armenia must necessarily remain a part of it. Any attempt by Russia to annex that territory must be resisted by Germany, as long as it is possible for Germany to support the Ottoman empire. In the light of these facts, it is plain why Germany notified Russia that the peace of Europe was endangered if she carried out the invasion of Armenia, which she had planned early in 1913.” (pp. 85-7)

The strategic imperative of the Ottomans holding onto eastern Anatolia against Russian designs would have been why Rohrbach considered the Armenian presence there a vital threat to the Empire and why he would have favoured a relocation of the population, despite his sympathy with the Armenians. That such a friend and supporter of the Armenians could see how they would be a threat to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in a war situation and would be employed as a Russian fifth column is of some significance. It is, however, an area which Armenian historians, who are very thorough in their research, have decided to leave alone and unknown. Armenian historians who explore this aspect have been warned they are intruding into very dangerous territory indeed for the effectiveness of the Genocide narrative.

Another important aspect of this is how Rohrbach viewed the “*character of Turkish Islam*” and how he saw the Ottoman Turks to be the only functional rulers of the region. No other people were capable of building a state or forming an authority over the various peoples there. Without the Ottomans would come chaos and the deluge:

“Mohammedanism in Turkey is not nearly so fanatical as in the (Arabian) territories where it is at home. The way in which the modern and better educated Turk approaches Islam is rational and practical. His religion offers him a certain general turn of mind, and a simple and commonplace morality which is well adapted to the needs of his everyday life, and more, a valuable discipline and if need be patriotic devotion. The Turk possesses strong military instincts and a soldierly mind, both of which would be impossible without a fund of moral qualities. If we remember, as we have already said, that fanaticism is not natural to him, we readily comprehend that the new state of the Young Turks enjoys forces of order and statesmanship which may permit them to maintain themselves in office and thus to preserve their state, provided they proceed to a rigorous reorganisation of their army and make use of every possible available resource to accomplish this end. It is quite possible that the existing political conditions will be disturbed by inner dissensions or other crises, but no other people but the Turks will be lastingly in the ascendancy in Asia Minor. If the English plans should materialize, such as the establishment of an

Egyptian or an Arabic caliphate under British suzerainty, and the direct or indirect incorporation of the Arabian territories belonging to Turkey into the British spheres of influence, a great war would have to follow...

We are not aiming to Germanize Turkey politically or economically or to colonise it here or there, but to introduce the German spirit into the great national process of development through which that oriental nation happens to be passing which has a future and which will continue to hold political sway over the lands from the Persian gulf to the Mediterranean.” (*The German Idea in the World*, pp. 227-31)

Paul Rohrbach’s view that, on the eve of the Great War, there were only two courses open for the region, Ottoman development under German assistance or destruction under British geopolitical meddling proved to an accurate estimation of things. And this had immense implications for the Ottoman Armenians. The Genocide lobbyists have no interest in this aspect of things i.e. they have no interest in accounting for why what befell the Armenians happened to them. The only objective is to shoehorn what happened into a Genocide Studies narrative suitable for political and academic patronage purposes.

### The Problem of the Reluctant Ottoman Relocators

The Armenian quoted in Ambassador Morgenthau’s *Diary* who suggested the Germans thought the Ottomans too merciful to the Armenians certainly had a point. That is a fact no one can deny. The Ottomans certainly refused to see the danger of the Armenians to their Empire in 1913/14 that was pointed out by German professors and military men. They continued to hope against hope that the Armenians would somehow see sense and return to their position as “*the loyal community*” of the Ottoman Empire. The Young Turks continued to work with the Dashnaks in the hope that their participation in the Ottoman parliament would bear fruit. This proved to be wishful thinking, although the Ottomans can hardly be criticised for not acting earlier or more forcefully. If the Ottomans had taken German advice and relocated the Armenians outside the catastrophe of war it is certain that the vast bulk of Armenians would have survived such an operation but the Germans/Ottomans would hardly have been given credit for it.

The Ottomans refused to uproot the Armenian community of Eastern Anatolia in 1913 or 1914, despite being warned by the Germans that they posed a serious security threat, as part of a planned and coming Tsarist invasion. The Ottoman intelligence agencies and sources within the Dashnaks told them that the Germans were right, and extensive arming and organising for insurrection was taking place, but they waited until the Dashnaks actually went into insurrection against the Ottoman State in late 1914/early 1915 to move against the Armenian community in the war zone and implement the German security advice. In fact, they waited for eight whole months of war to do so, until a serious assault was mounted in the Van region by Dashnak revolutionists, which massacred the Muslim population and handed the key strategic city over to the Russian invaders!

What must the Germans have thought about these delusional and reluctant Ottomans who could not see the danger for their state from the Armenian revolutionists and waited until it was far too late to act with purpose? Why were they so soft that only an existential crisis that threatened to annihilate them prompted them to take action to defend their state and citizens?

The Ottoman relocation policy is centrepiece of the “*Genocide*” allegation against the Turks. Prof. Edward

Erickson in his book '*Ottomans and Armenians: A Study in Counterinsurgency*' examines the relocation of a section of the Armenian populace and comes to the conclusion that it was primarily a military measure made necessary by an existential crisis involving a simultaneous four front invasion by Russian, British and French military and naval forces with co-ordinated internal risings by Armenian insurrectionists. He describes it as relocation rather than exile, deportation or ethnic cleansing, because there is nothing to suggest the Ottomans had any intention of permanently moving the Armenians and there is evidence, both from Ottoman and Armenian sources that there was every intention of returning them after the war emergency.

As Erickson notes, the Armenian relocations, although mainly conducted where the Russian threat was, were not instituted until mid-1915 when the situation became extremely serious due to almost complete encirclement. Tens of thousands of Armenian young men had joined armed bands or had deserted the Ottoman Army and gone over to the Russians. The Ottomans were aware that the general Armenian populace were not participating in these activities and did not take action against them but the Armenian rising in Van, in April 1915, was an important trigger for the relocations. This was orchestrated by Armenian revolutionaries in conjunction with a simultaneous offensive by the Russians. It resulted in a massacre of Turks and Kurds and the handing of the city over to the Russian Army.

The Ottomans had seen a serious threat developing to their lines of communication by early 1915. Armenian irregulars were ambushing Ottoman reinforcements, attacking military supply columns, cutting important telegraph communications to the rear of the lines and killing Muslims in undefended villages. These were not sporadic risings of ordinary Armenians. They were well-planned sabotage operations targeted to disrupt the Ottoman armies. They occurred at strategic points on the supply lines to the Ottoman Third army in the Caucasus, Sixth army in Mesopotamia and Fourth Army in Palestine. They cut these armies off from their vital supplies of ammunition, food, fodder, medical supplies, fuel, animals, spare parts and reinforcements.

The Great War context and the four front assault meant a new strategy had to be adopted by the Ottomans which was completely unprecedented. In their previous counter-insurgency measures against insurrections in the Balkans and Anatolia the Ottomans had used traditional methods of military suppression to overcome insurrectionary outbreaks. However, because the over-stretched military lacked the ability to carry out such traditional measures of internal security they had to resort, apparently, to the scheme that the Germans had urged on them before the War to deal with the Armenians.

This new strategy was inspired by such events as the English Parliament's relocations of the Irish (1650s), the Acadian Removal of French settlers in Nova Scotia to Louisiana by Britain (1755), the relocation of the Navaho, forced to walk from New Mexico to reservations by US forces (1865), Spanish action in Cuba (1896), US "*zones of protection*" in the Philippines under General Smith (1901) and British concentration camps against the Boers in South Africa (1901).

What can be seen by these examples is that this form of warfare was pioneered by the English and was largely conducted by the Anglosphere in its expansionary Imperialist wars.

Isn't it interesting that when Germany first used this method of counter-insurgency it was used by Anglophile German Imperialists in German South West Africa (1904), a territory adjacent to that in which the British used it against the Boers

during the years before, and Paul Rohrbach was one of its chief exponents?

What can be said in the Ottoman's favour is that when a relocation policy was finally used against the Armenians, in 1915, it was most reluctantly employed as a measure of last resort, during an actual crisis of existence in which the actual Ottoman State was threatened. It was not an operation employed in a far-flung Imperialist war of expansion but employed in self-defence to protect its citizens as a survival mechanism.

The Ottomans found themselves with only two alternatives if they were to free the war zones of people: The Anglo relocation strategy of temporary resettlement in areas the war could not reach (with the Ottoman promise of return when the emergency was passed) or else the Russian method of herding the population toward enemy lines.

## Conclusion

A fuller understanding of what actually happened in 1915 can now be had with historical knowledge, separated from the misinformation and disinformation promoted by the Armenian lobby and the anti-history, social science academics.

The Ottomans relocated the Armenian population of Eastern Anatolia in a situation of extreme war-time emergency and existential crisis of the state. It was a scheme unprecedented in Ottoman history and seems to have been advocated prior to the war by Anglophile German Imperialists impressed at the results the Anglosphere had achieved using such methods in warfare against native populations. It was part of what was understood to be the necessary work of liberal progress in the world conducted by the advance guard of Christian civilisation. Despite warnings from the Anglophile Germans that they were risking the continued existence and viability of their state by not recognising the Armenian population as a potentially serious threat, given Tsarist intentions to invade the area they inhabited, the Ottomans refused to relocate them until it became almost too late. The Ottomans hesitated to employ such thoroughgoing methods against the Armenian population during peacetime and only implemented the relocation strategy as a counter-insurgency response to multi-front invasion in the supreme moment of crisis in the war-zone, with an extensive Armenian insurrection taking place.

Out of the catastrophe of the Great War came a catastrophe for the people of Eastern Anatolia, Muslim and Armenian, in fairly even measure. The long-term consequences of this were, however, greater for the Armenian population, because the Ottomans remained in control of the state, despite everything that was thrown against them by the Imperialist Powers and those who attempted to avail of the world crisis to overturn the existing order and stability. If the Armenians had won in conjunction with the powerful forces of Russia, Britain and France, as the Dashnaks expected, the situation would have been, most probably reversed with the Muslim populace receiving little quarter. Armenian relations with the Azerbaijanis – who had nothing to do with the events of 1915 – suggest that an Armenian state, not fiercely curtailed by someone like Stalin, would have been both genocidal in instinct and practice. Armenian nationalism is simply a programme for Genocide in that it wants to recreate its vision of the world of the 5th Century BC within the modern context. Only vast ethnic cleansing and genocide would make such a thing possible.

Paul Rohrbach and the German connection to the Ottomans and Armenians have been presented in a social science narrative. But the truth of the matter is much more interesting, but also subversive, of the Armenian version of history.



## Kissinger at Davos, 2022

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### Transcript

Henry Kissinger: [00:02:59] Let me thank you for letting me return to Davos, because it is such a crucial forum for the exchange of ideas all over the world. But the outcome of this turning point — it's not yet obvious, because there are a number of issues which are still under consideration within the realm of the decision-makers and of course, many evolutions that are going on that will affect the outcome.

Let me sketch the issues. The most vivid at the moment is the war in Ukraine, and the outcome of that war, both in the military and political sense, will affect relations between groupings of countries, which I will mention in a minute. And the outcome of any war and the peace settlement, and the nature of that peace settlement — will determine whether the combatants remain permanent adversaries, or whether it is possible to fit them into an international framework.

About eight years ago, when the idea of membership of Ukraine in NATO came up, I wrote an article in which I said that the ideal outcome would be if Ukraine could be constituted as a neutral kind of state, as a bridge between Russia and Europe. Rather than, it's the front line of groupings within Europe. I think that opportunity is now- does not now exist in the same manner, but it could still be conceived as an ultimate objective. In my view, movement towards negotiations and negotiations on peace need to begin in the next two months so that the outcome of the war should be outlined. But before it could create upheaval and tensions that will be ever-harder to overcome, particularly between the eventual relationship of Russia, Georgia and of Ukraine towards Europe. Ideally, the dividing line should return the *status quo ante*. I believe to join the war beyond Poland would draw- turn it into a war and not about the freedom of Ukraine, which has been undertaken with great cohesion by NATO, but into against Russia itself and so, that seems to me to be the dividing line that it is just impossible to define. It will be difficult for anybody to gauge of that. Modifications of that may occur during the negotiations, which of course, have not yet been established, but which should begin to be the return of the major participants as the war develops, and I have given an outline of a possible military outcome. But I would like to keep in mind that any modifications of that could complicate the negotiations in which Ukraine has a right to be a significant participant, but in which one hopes that they match the heroism that they have shown in the war with wisdom for the balance in Europe and in the world at large — a relationship that will develop as a result of this war, between Ukraine — which will be probably the strongest conventional power on the continent — and the rest of Europe will develop over a period of time.

But one has to look both at the relationship of Europe to Russia over a longer period and in a manner that is separated from the existing leadership whose status, however, will be affected internally over a period of time by its performance in this in this period. Looked at from a long-term point of view, Russia has been, for 400 years, an essential part of Europe, and European policy over that period of time has been affected, fundamentally, by its European assessment of the role of Russia. Sometimes in an observing way, but on a number of occasions

as the guarantor, or the instrument, by which the European balance could be re-established. Current policy should keep in mind the restoration of this role is important to develop, so that Russia is not driven into a permanent alliance with China. But European relations with it are not the only key element of this [unintelligible].

China and the United States, we know that in the next years have to come to some definition of how to conduct the long-term relationship of countries, it depends on their strategic capacities, but also on their interpretation of these capacities. In recent years, China and the United States evolved into a relationship that is unique in each side's history. That is that they, from the point of view of strategic potential, they are the greatest threat to each other — in fact, the only military threat that each side needs to deal with continuously. And so the challenge, the period in which I was involved in the creation of this relationship, in which it was thought that a period of permanent collaboration might emerge of the two countries becoming [unintelligible] has been partly jeopardized and for the period probably terminated by the growth in the strategic and technical competence of each other. So on that level, there is an inherent adversarial aspect. The challenge is whether this adversarial aspect can be mitigated and progressively eased by the diplomacy that both sides conduct and it cannot be done unilaterally by one side. So, both sides have to come to the conviction that some easing of the political relationship is essential because they are in a position that has never existed before — plainly, that a conflict with modern technology, conducted in the absence of any preceding arms control negotiations, so they have no established criteria of limitations, will be a catastrophe for mankind.

Whatever their differences within the context of historical politics, the leaders have an obligation to prevent this and ensure, at a minimum, permanent consultations, serious consultations on the subject, legal gameplays on a permanent basis. And then it's an evolution of this.

Of course, there are many unfinished periods in the future of world. The emergence of additional nuclear powers, of which the most urgent is the rise of Iran and the consequent divisions in the Middle East. And as in the period directly affected by the Ukrainian issue, but affected by the balance that will emerge, the rise of countries like India and Brazil and other countries, will have to be integrated into an international system. They seem to me to be the key issues, together with the fact that the Ukraine conflict has produced a rupture in the economic arrangements that have been made in the period before, so that the definition and operation of a global system will have to be reconsidered.

It is these challenges I put forward as an analogy, but I believe they must be overcome, if we not going to live in an increasingly confrontational and chaotic world.

Klaus Schwab: [00:19:02] Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger, for this state of the world description.